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ABSTRACT
This Article looks critically at the procedural protections American
universities give students accused of sexual assault. It begins by situating
these policies historically, providing background to Title IX and the different
guidelines promulgated by the Department of Education. Next, it presents
original research on the procedural protections provided by the fifty flagship
state universities. In October 2014, university administrators were contacted
and asked a series of questions about the rights afforded to students,
including the standard of proof right to an adjudicatory hearing, right to
confront and cross examine witnesses, right to counsel, right to silence, and
right to appeal. This Article describes findings and then compares them with
prior studies. After arguing that state university students are entitled to
procedural due process, this Article uses the balancing test from Matthews v.
Eldridge to evaluate whether universities are adequately protecting the due
process rights of the accused. This Article concludes by considering how
universities can more fairly and effectively respond to sexual assault.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2012, Erica Kinsman,' then a freshman at Florida State
University (FSU), reported to campus police that she had been raped.2
Because the attack occurred off campus, Tallahassee police were called.'
Erica stated that she had been drinking at a popular bar, when she ended up
in a taxi with three men, all strangers.4 They brought her to an apartment
1. Erica Kinsman is being called by name because she publicly identified herself in a
documentary first shown at the Sundance Film Festival entitled, The Hunting Ground. Tyler
Kingkade, Erica Kinsman, Woman Who Accused Jameis Winston of Rape, Goes Public for the
First Time, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2015, 12:38 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/26/erica-kinsman-jameis-winston n 6539916.html.
2. TALLAHASSEE POLICE DEP'T, INCIDENT REPORT 2 (2012),
http://www.talgov.com/uploads/public/documents/assets/news/tpd-documents.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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where she claimed that one of them raped her.' After being transported back
to campus on the back of her assailant's scooter, Erica told a friend what
happened, and the friend called the police.6
The responding officer wrote that "as the investigation continued several
bruises began to appear on the victim."'7 Erica was transported to the hospital
where her injuries were photographed, and samples were taken to test for the
presence of semen.8 One month later, Erica told the investigating officer that
she recognized the man who raped her from one of her classes. 9 His name:
FSU football sensation, Jameis Winston."
Despite the identification, it took eleven months for Jameis' DNA to be
tested and compared with the semen found on Erica's underwear." In the
meanwhile, the FSU police secured a copy of the Tallahassee report, which
they gave to administrators in the Athletic Department, who then turned it
over to Jameis' lawyer. 12 All this happened before the prosecutor was even
notified of the case. Jameis' lawyer was able to secure signed affidavits from
Jameis' friends before they were interviewed by law enforcement, and both
swore that they had seen Jameis and Erica having consensual sex. Claiming
he would be unable to secure a conviction, the prosecutor chose not to file
charges. 3
Soon after, Jameis won the Heisman Trophy and led FSU to a national
championship. Although Title IX requires that allegations of sexual assault
be resolved quickly, Jameis' conduct hearing did not take place until twenty-
four months after the purported attack. 14 Retired Florida Supreme Court
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. E-mail from Erica Buckley, Investigator, to Jill Allison (Nov. 27, 2013, 12:53 PM) (on
file with author); Jill Allison, Report from Fla. Dep't of Law Enft (Dec. 2, 2013) (on file with
author).
12. Kevin Vaughan, Documents: Police, FSU Hampered Jameis Winston Investigation,
FoxSPORTS (Oct. 10, 2014, 4:23 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/college-football/story/jameis-
winston-florida-state-tallahassee-police-hindered-investigation-documents- 101014.
13. One of the reasons given was that Erica Kinsman had semen from two sources, Jameis
Winston and another person. Erica explained that the other person was her boyfriend, but that
explanation did not change the prosecutor's decision. Julie Montanaro, FSU QB Jameis Winston
Won't Face Charges, WCTV (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.wctv.tv/sports/headlines/BREAKING-
231816891.html.
14. Jerry Hinnen, Jameis Winston's Conduct Hearing Concludes on Its Second Day,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/jameis-
winstons-fsu-conduct-hearing-concludes-on-its-second-day/.
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Justice Major Harding conducted the inquiry, and on December 19, 2014, he
issued a finding that Jameis had not violated the FSU Code of Student
Conduct. 5 Erica voiced dismay at the result and later filed civil suit against
the university. 6 On January 25, 2016, FSU agreed to pay Kinsman $950,000
to settle the case.' Although it did not admit fault, FSU did assent to provide
five years of sexual assault awareness programs and to publish the results of
those programs.'8
Exactly two years later, on December 7, 2014, San Diego State University
(SDSU) sophomore, Francisco Sousa, met Jane Doe19 at an off-campus party.
Although Jane would later claim otherwise, text messages show that they
planned on meeting at the event.20 At one point in the evening, Francisco led
Jane by the hand to the bathroom where she orally copulated him. 21 Francisco
contended that the sex was consensual; indeed he said that she had done this
to him on a prior occasion.T ' Despite a picture of the two kissing a few weeks
earlier and flirtatious text messages stretching for several weeks before, and
then immediately after, the alleged attack, 3 Jane told the police that she did
not know Francisco well. She said the sex was forced.
Two days after the party, San Diego Police arrested Francisco for forcible
oral copulation and false imprisonment.24 He bailed out the next day.25 On
December 9, SDSU issued a notice of interim suspension, 6 and on December
15. Kevin Vaughan, Full Copy of Jameis Winston Hearing Decision, FOXSPORTS (Dec. 21,
2014, 6:27 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/college-football/story/full-copy-of-jameis-winston-
hearing-decision-122114.
16. Doe v. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 4:15-cv-00235-MW-CAS (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7,
2015).
17. Marc Tracy, Florida State Settles Suit over Jameis Winston Rape Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/20 16/01/26/sports/football/florida-state-to-pay-jameis-
winstons-accuser-950000-in-settlement.html? r=0.
18. Id.
19. Jane Doe is not her real name.
20. Letter from Michael D. McGlinn, Att'y for Francisco Sousa, to Dr. Lee Mintz, Dir., Ctr.
for Student Rights and Responsibilities, San Diego State 2 (Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Letter
from McGlinn] (on file with author).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at2 3.
24. Michael Fleeman, Arrest Made in San Diego Rape, One of a String near College
Campus, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/10/us-usa-
rape-califomia-idUSKBNOJO2AQ20141210.
25. Angie Lee & Richard Allyn, SDSU Sex Assault Suspect Out on Bail, CBS8.coM (Dec.
10, 2014, 6:23PM), http://www.cbs8.com/story/27599987/sdsu-sex-assault-suspect-out-on-bail.
26. Petition for Writ of Mandate at 18, Sousa v. San Diego State Univ., No. 37-2015-
000111 19-CU-WM-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2015),
http ://www.avoiceformalestudents.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Petition-for-Writ-of-
640 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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12, Francisco was notified that he was alleged to have sexually assaulted a
member of the campus community. An investigatory meeting was set with
SDSU Title IX Coordinator, Lee Mintz, for December 15.27 SDSU also issued
a community Safety Alert via email notifying students of the alleged assault
and naming Francisco as the suspect.
At the hearing on December 15, Francisco requested to review the basis
of the allegations against him, including any written statements made by the
complainant or any other witnesses. Mintz told Francisco she would turn over
this information at some future date and then urged him to make a statement,
saying that she could "reach a decision in the Title IX portion of the
investigation at any point. ' 28 Mintz also informed Francisco that "he would
not be entitled to a hearing on the Title IX portion of the matter, he would not
have the right to confront his accuser, he had no right to direct participation
of counsel, she would make findings of fact and reach conclusions of law and
mete out a sanction, and he would not be entitled to an appeal. 29
On nine different occasions, from December 12, 2014 to March 12, 2015,
Francisco sent letters through his attorneys formally requesting information
about the charges against him. On February 6, 2015, he sent Mintz a letter
containing evidence that supported his innocence. Five days later, the San
Diego County District Attorney's Office elected not to file charges in the
case.
On March 5, Francisco sent another letter to Mintz, this time with copies
of the San Diego State Police Report that his lawyer independently obtained.
In this letter, Francisco pointed out inconsistencies between Jane's account
(which he was reading for the first time) and text messages and other
documentation. Once again, Francisco requested information about the case,
including a copy of the complaint that Jane had made with Mintz, which was
referenced but not included in the police report. On April 2, after sixteen
months of waiting, Francisco filed a writ in superior court, requesting that
SDSU be ordered to provide notice of the allegations and evidence against
him as well as a reasonable opportunity to provide responsive evidence.3"
Mandate-Francisco-Sousa-San-Diego-State-University-filed-20 15-4-2.pdf (attached "Notice of
Interim Suspension" from Eric Rivera San Diego State University's Vice President for Student
Affairs to Francisco Sousa).
27. Letter from Lee Mintz, Dir., Ctr. for Student Rights and Responsibilities, San Diego
State Univ., to Francisco Sousa (Dec. 12, 2014) (on file with author).
28. Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 26, at 6 7.
29. Letter from McGlinn, supra note 20, at 4.
30. Petition for Writ of Mandate, supra note 26, at 6 7.
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High profile cases like that of Erica Kinsman and Francisco Sousa have
brought a much-needed spotlight to campus rape. In 2011, the Department of
Education, Officer of Civil Rights (OCR) issued its Dear Colleague Letter
(DCL), in which it called the statistics on sexual violence "deeply troubling
and a call to action for the nation."'" It then cited a study by the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ) which, according to OCR, had found "about 1 in 5
women are victims of completed or attempted sexual assault while in
college. 32 As it turns out, OCR's statement was misleading. The NIJ study
looked only at two large public universities, and the findings were not
nationally representative.33 Nor in subsequent communications did OCR ever
discuss the results of a nationally representative study conducted by the
Department of Justice that found significantly lower rates of rape and sexual
assault among college women. "
OCR reminded universities that sexual violence constitutes a form of
discrimination under Title IX. 35 It told universities that in order to be in
compliance, they had to change disciplinary proceedings to more effectively
hold rapists accountable.36 Since college discipline is civil and not criminal,
it is not subject to the same constitutional constraints like the accused's right
to confront and cross examine witnesses3 and the state's burden to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.38 In no uncertain terms, OCR told
universities that they had to reduce the standard of proof in disciplinary
proceedings to a preponderance of the evidence, and it strongly discouraged
31. Letter from Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep't of Educ., to Title IX Coordinators 2 (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. Statistics on campus
sexual assault will be discussed in more detail below.
32. Id.
33. See CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY vii (2007),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/nij/grants/22 1153.pdf.
34. SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE AGE FEMALES, 1995-2013, at 1 (Dec. 2014).
Note that the NCVS has been criticized for underestimating the incidence or rape and sexual
assault. See PANEL ON MEASURING RAPE & SEXUAL ASSAULT IN BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT 4 5 (Candace Kruttschnitt et al. eds., National Academies Press, 2014).
35. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31, at 1.
36. Id. atl 3,7 14.
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that
this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions); see also
Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (The Sixth Amendment "commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination.").
38. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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them from allowing the parties to directly question one another.39 It also told
universities that they should not allow the respondent to review the
complainant's statement unless she was able to review his. 4 OCR threatened
to withhold federal funding to universities that did not adequately respond, 41
and it later published a list that continues to grow of those under
investigation.42 OCR has found that a number of schools were in violation of
Title IX, including Princeton University43 and Harvard Law School.44 These
schools have since reached settlements with OCR, in which they agreed to
change the way they handle sexual assault so as to meet the protocol set forth
in the DCL.45
Some applaud OCR's efforts, 46 including at least ninety professors who
signed a recently released White Paper in support of the DCL,47 but others
contend that universities have gone too far in sacrificing the rights of the
39. Id. atll 12.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 16.
42. See infra notes 100 01 and accompanying text.
43. Princeton University Found in Violation of Title IX Reaches Agreement with U.S.
Education Department to Address, Prevent Sexual Assault and Harassment of Students, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC. (Nov. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Princeton Violation], http://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/princeton-university-found-violation-tite-ix-reaches-agreement-us-educatin-
department-address-prevent-sexual-assault-and-harassment-students.
44. Harvard Law School Found in Violation of Title IX Agrees to Remedy Sexual
Harassment, Including Sexual Assault of Students, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Dec. 30, 2014)
[hereinafter Harvard Violation], http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/harvard-law-school-
found-violation-title-ix-agrees-remedy-sexual-harassment-including-sexua-assaut-students.
45. See Harvard Violation, supra note 30; Princeton Violation, supra note 29.
46. See Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to
Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1978 (2016); Amy Chmielewski, Note, Defending the
Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 143, 149 74 (2013); Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process that is Due:
Preponderance of the Evidence as the Standard ofProoffor University Adjudications of Student-
on-Student Sexual Assault Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1642 55 (2012).
47. See KATHERINE K. BAKER ET AL., TITLE IX AND THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE:
A WHITE PAPER 12 15 (2016).
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accused.48 Members of the law faculty at both Harvard49 and the University
of Pennsylvania 0 have publicly called for greater procedural rights for the
accused, and a Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institute
decried OCR's Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) for "institutionalizing a
presumption of guilt in sexual assault cases."'" In addition, the popular press
started to call attention to the experiences of men who say their universities
never gave them a meaningful chance to defend themselves before finding
them responsible for rape and expelling them. 2
More significantly, Congress and the courts have begun to take notice of
the impact the DCL has had on college campuses. On January 7, 2016, in a
move that may signal the demise of the DCL in a Republican controlled
Congress, Senator James Lankford, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management, U.S. Senate Committee on
Government Affairs and Homeland Security, wrote a letter to the Acting
Secretary for the Department of Education demanding that DOE provide
48. See William A. Jacobsen, Accused on Campus: Charges Dropped, but the Infamy
Remains, LEGAL INSURRECTION (May 16, 2015, 8:30 PM),
http://legalinsurrection.com/2015/05/accused-on-campus-charges-dropped-but-the-infamy-
remains/; see also Ryan D. Ellis, Note, Mandating Injustice: The Preponderance of the Evidence
Mandate Creates a New Threat to Due Process on Campus, 32 REV. LITIG. 65, 80 81 (2013);
Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, a Brick on the Other: Tilting the Scale
Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV.
591, 599 (2013); Stephen Henrick, Note, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX
and Sexual Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49, 50 51 (2013); Naomi Shatz,
Feminists, We Are Not Winning the War on Campus Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29,
2014, 6:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/naomi-shatz/feminists-we-are-not-
winn b 6071500.html.
49. Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard's Sexual Harassment Policy, BOSTON
GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-
sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html.
50. David Rudovsky et al., Open Letter from Members of the Penn Law School Faculty,
Sexual Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and the Accused Students at Universities,
PHILLY.COM (Feb. 18, 2015), http://media.philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf.
51. Peter Berkowitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of Male Guilt,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119035969045765
16232905230642.
52. Tovia Smith, Some Accused of Sexual Assault on Campus Say System Works Against
Them, NPR (Sept. 3, 2014, 1:12 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/03/345312997/some-accused-
of-campus-assault-say-the-system-works-against-them; Teresa Watanabe, More College Men
Are Fighting Back Against Sexual Misconduct Cases, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2014, 6:15 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-sexual-assault-legal-20140608-story.html; Emily Yoffe,
The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double -x/doublex/20 14/12/college-rape-campus-sexual-assault-
is a seriousjproblem but the efforts.html.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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statutory authority for the DCL.53 Although Catherine E. Lhamon, the
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, wrote a response,54 Lankford was not
satisfied:
I again call on you personally to clarify that these policies are not
required by Title IX, but reflect only one of various ways schools
may choose to develop and implement policies for the prevention
and remedy of sexual harassment and sexual violence that best meet
the needs of their students and are compliant with federal law. I
further ask that you immediately rein in the regulatory abuses within
the Department of Education and take measures to ensure that all
existing and future guidance documents issued by your agency are
clearly and firmly rooted in statutory authority.
55
Even if Congress does not pass legislation that specifically strikes down
the DCL, courts across the country have been finding that current protections
violate procedural due process. 56 For example, in July 2015, a judge ordered
the University of California, San Diego to reverse the suspension of a male
student because the disciplinary proceedings violated his due process rights,57
and nine months later, a different judge overturned the suspension of a
University of Southern California student on the ground that he was denied a
fair hearing and the substantive evidence did not support the Appeal Panel's
findings. 8 On March 31, 2016, the Massachusetts District Court ruled in
favor of a Brandeis University student who had been found responsible for
53. Letter from Sen. James Lankford, Chairman, Subcomm. on Reg. Aff. & Fed. Mgmt.,
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Aff., U.S. Senate, to The Hon. John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.scribd.com/doc/294821262/Sen-Lankford-letter-
to-Education-Department.
54. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y of C.R., to The Hon. James Lankford,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Reg. Aff. & Fed. Mgmt., Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Aff., U.S.
Senate (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/DEPT. / 20of%/ 2OEDUCATION / 20RESPONSE / 20TO / 2
OLANKFORD%20LETTER%/o202-17-16.pdf.
55. Letter from Sen. James Lankford, Chairman, Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs & Fed.
Mgmt., Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, U.S. Senate, to The Hon. John B. King, Jr.,
Acting Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/3.4.160/ 20Lankford / 201etter / 20to / 20Dept.
%20of%/o20Education.pdf.
56. See Jake New, Court Wins for Accused, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/05/more-students-punished-over-sexual-assault-
are-winning-lawsuits-against-colleges.
57. Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL,
2015 WL 4394597, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015).
58. Doe v. Univ. of S. Cal., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851, 877 (Ct. App. 2016).
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"serious sexual transgressions."59 The court wrote, "Brandeis appears to have
substantially impaired, if not eliminated, an accused student's right to a fair
and impartial process. '"60 The court was particularly troubled by the
deprivation of the right to cross-examine 61 as well as the lack of notice about
the underlying allegations.62
Although many have opined on this new world of university disciplinary
proceedings, inadequate attention has been paid to the rights actually being
afforded to students. A 1999 study by Berger and Berger looked at procedural
protections in state and private universities, but they focused on cases of
academic misconduct.63 In 2002, Karjane, Fisher, and Cullen conducted a
Department of Justice funded study into how institutions of higher education
(IHEs) respond to sexual assault.64 Their study was extensive, and it included
a content analysis of published sexual assault policy materials from a
nationally representative sample of IHEs .6 Although the scope of this work
is extraordinary, it took place before the 2011 DCL, and so it may not reflect
current practices.
This leaves a major gap in the literature, which this Article attempts to fill.
It provides a systematic description, based on original research, of the
procedural protections that the fifty flagship state universities provide when
a student is accused of sexual assault. Emphasizing the importance of process
should not be confused with minimizing the seriousness of rape, which is
"one of the most severe of all traumas, causing multiple, long-term negative
outcomes, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression,
substance abuse, suicidality, repeated sexual victimization, and chronic
59. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar.
31,2016).
60. Id. at *6.
61. Id. at *34 35 ("While protection of victims of sexual assault from unnecessary
harassment is a laudable goal, the elimination of such a basic protection for the rights of the
accused raises profound concerns .... Here, there were essentially no third-party witnesses to any
of the events in question, and there does not appear to have been any contemporary corroborating
evidence. The entire investigation thus turned on the credibility of the accuser and the accused.
Under the circumstances, the lack of an opportunity for cross-examination may have had a very
substantial effect on the fairness of the proceeding.").
62. Id. at *34.
63. Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the
University Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 301 (1999).
64. See generally HEATHER M. KARJANE, BONNIE S. FISHER & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, CAMPUS
SEXUAL ASSAULT: How AMERICA'S INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION RESPOND (2002),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/nij/grants/196676.pdf.
65. Id. at vi.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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physical health problems. 66 Instead this Article takes the position that rape
is a serious problem but that reducing procedural protections is the wrong
way to address it.
This Article begins by situating university disciplinary proceedings legally
and historically. It then moves to the central contribution-the study of
procedural protections afforded at the fifty flagship state universities. After
describing research methods, it presents findings and compares them with
prior studies. This Article then uses insights from studies on deception and
bias to argue that the protections most schools afford are constitutionally
inadequate. This Article concludes by considering how universities can more
fairly and effectively respond to sexual assault.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the 1964 Civil
Rights Act into law.6 Although much of the Act was aimed at preventing
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, 68 Title
VII-which banned workplace discrimination-specifically included sex as
a protected class. 69 Eight years later, Congress extended the protection against
sex discrimination to the classroom with Title IX. 70 Enacted as part of the
Educational Amendments of 1972, Title IX barred sex discrimination in any
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
Although there were exceptions, such as for fraternities, any institution that
violated Title IX could lose federal funding.72
At first, Title IX was interpreted narrowly.73 In Grove City College v. Bell,
the Supreme Court held that Title IX did not apply to an entire institution, but
66. Rebecca Campbell, The Psychological Impact of Rape Victims' Experiences with the
Legal, Medical andHealth Systems, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 702, 703 (2008).
67. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012)).
68. Id. §§ 201, 601 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a), 2000(d) (2012)).
69. Id. § 703(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)).
70. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901 03, 86 Stat. 235, 373 75
(1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)).
71. Id.
72. Id. §§ 901(a)(5), 902 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1681(a)(5) (2012)).
73. See Jollee Faber, Expanding Title LY of the Education Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit
Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 85, 113 n. 119 (1992); Trudy
Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title IX. Have We Made Progress?, 31
CREIGHTONL. REV. 1107, 1108 09 (1998).
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just to the particular program receiving federal assistance." Congress
responded by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 to clarify the
"broad application of Title IX."'7 It explicitly extended Title IX "to all of the
operation[s] of ... a college, university, or other postsecondary institution,
or a public system of higher education ... any part of which is extended
Federal financial assistance."' 6
It took a while for courts to agree that Title IX extended to peer sexual
harassment, but in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the
Supreme Court answered the question definitively, holding that Title IX did
apply to peer-on-peer sexual harassment. In an opinion authored by Justice
Kennedy, the Court wrote: "Having previously held that such harassment is
'discrimination' in the school context under Title IX, this court is constrained
to conclude that student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe,
can likewise rise to the level of discrimination actionable under the statute. "79
The Court then determined that a school could be held liable for monetary
damages in a private lawsuit if one student sexually harasses another in the
school's program.8" To prevail, the complainant had to meet the conditions
of notice and indifference set forth in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District.8' In Gebser, the Court held that the standard of liability set
forth in the 1997 Policy Guidance was too lax,82 and to recover damages the
plaintiff had to prove that "an official who at a minimum has authority to
address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the
recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's
74. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573 74 (1984).
75. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2(1), 102 Stat. 28 (1998).
76. Education Amendments of 1972 § 908(2)(A). Note that the law actually reached more
broadly, to extend for instance to "a department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or of a local government." Id. § 908(1)(A).
77. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of the school district on the ground that Title IX did not impose
liability for peer sexual harassment because it only covered acts perpetrated by recipients of
federal grants).
78. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653 54 (1999).
79. Id. at 630 31.
80. Id. at 640-41. The Court had previously held in Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public
Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), that students had a private right to damages when their Title IX
rights were violated.
81. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641 42 (citing Gebserv. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,
289 (1998)).
82. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292 93.
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programs" and "refuses to take action to bring the recipient into
compliance."83
These rulings are significant because they extended the federal
government's power to police colleges and universities. As long as a school
receives federal funding, the institution is required to comply with Title IX.84
Federal student loans count, which effectively makes every college and
university subject to Title IX.85 And since institutions are now liable for the
harassment of one student against another, they can no longer afford to just
ignore what happens in dorm rooms and fraternities. At the same time,
however, the Court showed that it would not hesitate to reign in the
Department of Education (DOE) if the Justices disagreed with its
interpretation of Title IX.
Despite the high standard of proof for liability, universities face significant
lawsuits. United Educator (UE), which provides insurance to 1,200 member
universities, recently began offering insurance to cover sexual assault
payouts.86 Between 2006 and 2010, UE paid out $36 million; 72% of the
settlements were provided to parties suing the schools for incidents of sexual
assault.87 In 2014, the University of Connecticut settled a $1.28 million suit,
and the University of Colorado at Boulder settled a suit for $825 thousand.88
A. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights
Congress explicitly left enforcement of Title IX in the hands of the
departments and agencies that allocated federal funds to education programs
and/or activities.89 These agencies were "authorized and directed" to
effectuate the prohibition against sexual discrimination. 90 They were
supposed to do so "by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
83. Id. at 290.
84. Id. at 285 87.
85. Title IX. Title IX Legal Manual, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix#A. / C2 / AO / 2OFederal / 2OFinancia1 / 2OAssistance (last
visited Nov. 6, 2016).
86. Id.
87. Gayle Nelson, The High Cost of Sexual Assaults on College Campuses, NONPROFIT Q.
(June 23, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/20 15/06/23/the-high-cost-of-sexual-assaults-on-
college-campuses/.
88. LARGE Loss REPORT 2015, UNITED EDUCATORS INS. 5 (2015),
https://www.ue.org/uploadedFiles/Largeloss_2015 Final.pdf.
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
90. Id.
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applicability."'" Compliance with these rules could be achieved "(1) by the
termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such
program or activity... or (2) by any other means authorized by law. '9 2 OCR
has published three guides to how schools should adjudicate sexual assault
cases.
93
1. 1997 Guide
In 1997, OCR published its first official guidance in the Federal Register
on how schools should investigate and resolve allegations of sexual
harassment. 94 Before drafting the document, OCR met with representatives
from interested parties, including students, teachers, school administrators
and researchers.95 It also twice publicly requested comments. 96
In the 1997 Guide, OCR enumerated certain factors that grievance
procedures should contain in order to be in compliance with Title IX. They
included provisions providing for notice to students and other interested
parties, such as "adequate, reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints,
including the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence";
"designated and reasonably prompt time frames for the major stages of the
complaint process"; notice of the outcome to the parties; and "an assurance
that the school will take steps to prevent reoccurrence of any harassment and
to correct its discriminatory effects on the complainant and others, if
appropriate."' 97 OCR explicitly permitted schools to use a general student
disciplinary procedure in responding to sexual harassment.98
The 1997 Guide also discussed the due process rights of the accused. OCR
wrote: "[t]he rights established under Title IX must be interpreted
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES,
OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (2001) [hereinafter REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE], https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/shguide.pdf; Sexual Harassment
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Guidance 1997],
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar01.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); Dear
Colleague Letter, supra note 31.
94. Sexual Harassment Guidance 1997, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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consistently with any federally guaranteed rights involved in a complaint
proceeding."99 In addition to constitutional rights, OCR recognized that there
could be additional rights created by "State law, institutional regulations and
policies,... and collective bargaining agreements."'00 OCR emphasized that
respecting the procedural rights of both parties was an important part of a just
outcome. "Indeed, procedures that ensure the Title IX rights of the
complainant while at the same time according due process to both parties
involved will lead to sound and supportable decisions. Schools should ensure
that steps to accord due process rights do not restrict or unnecessarily delay
the protections provided by Title IX to the complainant.' 0'1
2. 2001 Guide
In 2001, OCR published a revised guide to sexual harassment under Title
IX in the Federal Register principally in response to the Supreme Court's
rulings in Gebser and Davis.10 2 As with the 1997 Guide, the 2001 Guide went
through notice and comment.0 3 Although the Supreme Court had rejected the
standard of liability advocated by OCR for liability in private lawsuits, OCR
emphasized that it still had the power to "'promulgate and enforce
requirements that effectuate [Title IX's] nondiscrimination mandate,' even in
circumstances that would not give rise to a claim for money damages.' 0 4
As compared with the 1997 Guide, the biggest change to the 2001's
section on adjudication of sexual harassment complaints had to do with its
increased emphasis on the rights of the accused. The 2001 Guide now had a
section entitled "Due Process Rights of the Accused."105 In addition to being
slightly reorganized, this newly appointed section told schools "the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) does not override federally
protected due process rights of persons accused of sexual harassment."'1 6 It
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 93, at i. In the 1997 Guide, OCR
said that the standard of liability for monetary damages should be "known or should have known,"
a standard that was clearly rejected in Gebser. See Sexual Harassment Guidance 1997, supra note
93.
103. REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 93, at ii.
104. Id. (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 22.
106. Id.
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concluded by saying, "[s]chools should be aware of these rights and their
legal responsibilities to individuals accused of harassment."' 1 7
3. 2011 Dear Colleague Letter
In 2011, OCR issued the Dear Colleague Letter (DCL), which it deemed
to be a "significant guidance document"'18 (i.e., disclaiming any status as an
independent legislative rule). OCR contended that the DCL "does not add
requirements to applicable law, but provides information and examples to
inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether covered entities are
complying with their legal obligation."'' 09
Unlike the 1997 and 2001 Guides, OCR did not post a formal notice
requesting feedback on the proposed changes. Some university officials
responsible for enforcing Title IX have voiced frustration with OCR for not
requesting input. As one administrator explained, "I'm not sure if all of the
mandates have been thought through for all universities in all universities'
context, it feels like stuff is missing or there would have been benefit to
talking to campus administrators who are already doing this. ' ' 1°
OCR laid out a number of recommendations and requirements in the DCL,
which will be discussed at length below. Three modifications to the
disciplinary proceedings are of particular note: (1) OCR strongly discouraged
schools from allowing the parties to directly question one another;"' (2) OCR
told schools that they "should not allow the alleged perpetrator to review the
complainant's statement without also allowing the complainant to review the
alleged perpetrator's statement";" 2 and (3) OCR required schools to set the
standard of proof at preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and
convincing evidence that some schools had been using."'
OCR justified reducing the standard of proof to preponderance on the
grounds that it is the standard used in Title VII hearings," 4 but as will be
discussed below, it did not adopt Title VII protections that would have
benefited the accused. For instance, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 gives both
parties in a Title VII case the right to a jury trial if one party requests
107. Id.
108. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31, at 1 n.1.
109. Id.
110. Telephone Interview with University Administrator (Nov. 14, 2014).
111. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31, at 12.
112. Id. at 11-12.
113. Id. at 11.
114. Id. at 10 11.
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compensatory or punitive damages." 5 The right to trial means that both
parties enjoy a panoply of other protections including the right to counsel and
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Not only does DOE not
mandate or even recommend that these Title VII rights be provided, the DCL
affirmatively recommends against some of them. For instance, OCR strongly
discourages schools from allowing the parties to directly question one
another. 116
B. Enforcement
Although a university has never lost federal funding for violating Title
IX, 1 17 DOE seems to be taking a more aggressive stance. As mentioned
earlier, OCR has found a number of schools to be in violation of Title IX,
including Princeton" 8 and Harvard Law School." 9 These schools have since
reached settlements with OCR in which they agreed to change the way they
handle sexual assault so as to meet the protocol set forth in the DCL.12 °
On May 1, 2014, DOE released a list of forty-four colleges and
universities under investigation, 121 and the number has grown to at least
241.122 This information was released even though the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is statutorily barred from releasing the
names of those under investigation in Title VII cases, 123 and "(a)ny person
who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.' 124
Similarly, the Department of Justice has an explicit policy against releasing
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2012).
116. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31, at 12.
117. As of May 1, 2014, no university had ever lost funding for violating Title IX. See Tyler
Kingkade, 55 Colleges Face Sexual Assault Investigations, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2014,
11:22 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/0 1/college-sexual-
assault n 5247267.html.
118. See Princeton Violation, supra note 43.
119. See Harvard Violation, supra note 44.
120. See Princeton Violation, supra note 43; Harvard Violation, supra note 44.
121. See U.S. Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions with
Open Title LYSexual Violence Investigations, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (May 1, 2014),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-higher-education-
institutions -open-title -i.
122. See Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC.,
http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012) ("Charges shall not be made public by the
Commission.").
124. Id
48:0637]
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL
information on current investigations except in unusual circumstances. 125 The
reason for this non-disclosure policy is in part because "Justice Department
guidelines, rules of professional conduct, and rules of court, as well as
considerations of fairness to defendants, require that we not make comments
that could prejudice a defendant's right to a fair trial."' 126
Even if universities do not take the threat of losing federal funding
seriously, such public shaming may have an effect. Two recent articles have
discussed how universities under suspicion for violating Title IX are
receiving fewer applications from prospective students and fewer donations
from alumni. 2
II. SURVEY RESEARCH: PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES
In October 2014, fifty flagship state universities were contacted by email
and asked a series of questions about the procedural protections afforded to
students alleged to have committed sexual assault. 128 All were asked about
protections considered fundamental to those accused of a crime by the state:
the standard of proof, right to an adjudicatory hearing, right to confront and
cross examine witnesses, right to counsel, right to silence, and right to appeal.
Other than the right to appeal, all are part of the Bill of Rights, which through
the incorporation clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been deemed to
apply to the states. 129
125. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (June 23, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ri/frequently-asked-questions-0.
126. Id.
127. See Gayle Nelson, The High Cost of Sexual Assaults on College Campuses, NONPROFIT
Q. (June 23, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/06/23/the-high-cost-of-sexual-assaults-
on-college-campuses/; see also Tyler Kingkade, Alumni Are Creating a Network to Put Pressure
on Universities over Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (May 28, 2014, 4:37 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/28/alumni-network-sexual-assault-
college n 5401194.html.
128. The author used a table from the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education to determine the
flagship universities. Because State University of New York (SUNY) was not on the list, the
author chose SUNY Albany because it is the capital of New York. See Ranking the Nation's
Flagship State Universities and Historically Black Colleges on Their Success in Enrolling Low-
Income Students, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC.,
http://www.jbhe.com/news views/60_lowincomeenrolls.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
129. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from depriving
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. In determining what that meant, the Supreme Court turned to the first ten amendments of the
Constitution, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights. Over time, in piecemeal fashion, the Court
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Although a few universities responded to the initial inquiry, many did so
only after additional emails and phone calls. Some administrators were
extremely reluctant to share information, 3 ' and most of those who agreed to
talk more generally about their feelings towards the current climate did so
only with the promise that neither they nor their institution be identified. On-
line policies were used to fill in the gaps, but even if the written policy
answered most or even all the questions,' 3' follow-up emails and/or phone
calls were attempted to confirm results. As of July 1, 2016, nine universities
have not responded: University of Idaho, University of Montana, University
of Nevada, University of New Hampshire, University of Oklahoma,
University of Oregon, University of Rhode Island, and University of South
Dakota. Thus, all the information on those schools' adjudicatory procedures
was gleaned from on-line information.
Many of the university officials interviewed voiced confidence that
students' rights were being respected. For instance, one administrator said,
"A student can always be disappointed with an outcome, but did they think
they were treated fairly? I've had letters from students that were expelled but
thanked me for the support they were given." 132
A few, however, were concerned by the current climate. As one official
framed it:
The pendulum has shifted so far that it's 'ready, fire, aim' when it
comes to the rights of respondents. Whether truly innocent, the
reality is that OCR wants you to take action against them because
underreporting is such a huge problem so that even if we get it
wrong .... This system is offensive to legal minds .... We are the
people breaking the casks of whiskey during prohibition. This is the
held that almost all of these rights were protected against state action through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Natalie M. Banta, Substantive Due Process
in Exile: The Supreme Court's Original Interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 13 WYo. L. REv. 151, 166 78 (2013) (discussing the development of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause).
130. For instance, one Title IX official stated that he would not answer any questions.
Information from that school was obtained from someone in the Dean's office. At another school,
the person working as the Title IX Officer hung up the phone, but, fortunately, another person at
that institution was willing to answer questions.
131. Only six schools (twelve percent) provided all of the information in their on-line
policies: University of Kansas, University of Nebraska, University of North Dakota, Ohio State
University, University of South Carolina, and University of Washington. These universities were
still contacted to confirm that the information accurately reflected current policy.
132. Telephone Interview with University Administrator (Jan. 29, 2015).
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law, but it doesn't feel quite right. To be in the trenches doesn't feel
quite right.'33
A. Findings
The tables below show the findings of this investigation.
Table 1: Standard of Proof
Stndr of proof
iffrn stndr for
no-e ofenes
As Table 1 shows, fifty universities (100%) have the standard of proof set
at preponderance of the evidence. Seven states (14%) set a higher standard of
proof for non-sex allegations. 3 4 One of them only used a higher standard for
academic violations but used the same preponderance standard for all non-
academic misconduct. Of the seven schools that use a higher standard for
non-sex allegations, one uses proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the others
use clear and convincing evidence.
Table 2: Right to an Adjudicatory Hearing
Inetgtr 
I
840 Adjudicatory 160 Investigatory 0% Unknown
(42) 1(8)
All schools used either an adjudicatory or an investigatory model for
determining whether a violation occurred. For the forty-two schools (84%)
that used the adjudicatory model, the first step was almost always an initial
investigation, but the determination of whether a violation occurred could be
made at an adjudicatory hearing. An adjudicatory hearing is similar to a trial
in the sense that evidence is presented in one hearing in front of a fact finder
with the accused present. Witnesses testify at the hearing, although schools
usually allow hearsay evidence, which means that the fact finder may
consider a witness interview conducted by the Title IX investigator.
Eight schools (16%) used an investigatory model. The investigatory model
is one in which a single investigator (or sometimes two) prepares a report
133. Telephone Interview with University Administrator (Oct. 17, 2014).
134. Of these, three had additional limitations: one had a higher standard only if there was a
formal hearing, one had a higher standard only if the case resulted in expulsion, and one had a
higher standard only if the student was facing suspension or expulsion.
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after having met with the parties and any witnesses. The accused student does
not have the right to be present for these interviews. Sometimes that same
investigator determines whether a violation occurred, and sometimes the
report is turned over to a third party (or parties) who determine(s) whether a
violation occurred based on the contents of the investigation report. That
person may request additional information, but there will never be a live
hearing in which all of the evidence is presented in one place with the accused
present.
Table 3: Schools that Provide Right to Adjudicatory Hearing
AdjtidicatorN Model Detail (%V of 42 schools
98% - Yes (41) 0% Unknown
2% - Yes, Limited-school decides (1)
0% - Yes, Limited-evidence (0)
17% - 1 staff/ faculty / admin / outsider (7) 50% Unknown (2)
2% - 1-2 faculty / staff /admin (1)
14.3% - 3 or more faculty / staff /4admin (6)
57% - 3 or more faculty / staff /student (24)
2% - 3 or more student only (1)
2% - 3 or more unspecified (1)
64.3% -majority (27) 12% Unknown (5)
12% - I decider (5)
2% - I or 2 deciders (1)
7% - consensus (3)
2% -unanimous (1)
For the forty-two schools that used the adjudicatory model, forty-one
(98%) gave the accused the absolute right to an adjudicatory hearing. That
meant that if he requested a hearing to resolve guilt, he would get one. One
school (2%) allowed for an adjudicatory hearing but only if the school
decided it was the appropriate way to determine guilt.
For those schools that used an adjudicatory model, seven (17%) allowed
a single person to determine responsibility. One school (2%) had one or two
decide. Six schools (14.3%) had a panel of three or more faculty, staff or
administrators. Twenty-four (57%) had a panel of three or more, but it
included students. One (2%) had a panel of three or more students determine
responsibility, and one (2%) had three or more decide, but the exact
composition was unknown.
Twenty-seven schools (64.3%) used a majority vote to determine guilt.
The minimum size of the adjudicatory body using a majority vote was three.
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Five schools (12%) had one person make the decision, and one school (2%)
required that one or two make the decision. Three schools (7%) required that
the decision be made by consensus, and one school (2%) mandated that the
decision be unanimous.
Table 4: Schools that Use Investigatory Model
JiwestigatorQ Nodel Dietail 4%of 8 schools)
50% Single Model-Investigator & 0% Unknown (0)
Decision-Maker are the Same (4)
1. 38% -Split Model-Investigator Reports &
SepaaeSnle Individual Decides (3)
12% -Split Model-Investigator Reports &
I I I ? or More Individuals Decide (1)
All of the schools that used the investigatory model had an investigator
prepare a report into what occurred, but they differed regarding who
determined responsibility. Four schools (50%) used the single investigator
model. That meant that the person who investigated the case was also
responsible for determining whether a violation had occurred. Three schools
(38%) used a split model in which one person investigated, and a separate
person determined whether a violation had occurred. One school (12%) had
two or more people (all separate from the investigator) determine whether a
violation had occurred.
Table 5: Right to Confront and Cross Examine
fig Yes - 10% (5)Limited through investigator - 6% (3)Limited through panel - 66% (33)
No - 14% (7)
Unknown - 4% (2)
As Table 5 shows, only five schools give the accused the right to directly
question the complainant. One has a referee to ensure there is no harassment,
and another discourages direct questioning.
Thirty-six schools provide for a limited right to question the complainant.
Three of these schools (6%) require that the question be asked through the
investigator who can decide whether to ask it. If the investigator does ask, the
accused will not be there to hear the answer. The other thirty-three (66%) that
allow a limited right to question require the respondent to submit a question
orally or in writing to the hearing officer, who decides whether to ask. Some
of these schools explicitly state that the complainant need not be present or
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respond, and this author believes that this policy applies to most, if not all, of
the schools except the five mentioned above. Seven schools (14%) do not
allow any questioning of the other side, either direct or indirect. Two schools
(4%) were unknown.
Table 6: Additional Procedural Rights
Yes, robust Yes, as advisor Yes, but 4%o(2) 0% (0)
Rihlt 6 %o(8) but silent in limited role
76%o(38)
Yes, no adverse Yes, but adverse inference may 0% (0) 10% (5)
inference 84% (42) be drawn 6% (3)
Yes 2% (1) 0% (0)
98% (49)
As Table 6 shows, the vast majority of universities (48, 96%) gave accused
students the right to counsel, but it was almost always an abridged right. Just
eight schools (16%) gave a robust right to counsel. That meant the attorney
would be allowed to participate fully in the hearing by questioning witnesses
and addressing the panel directly. Thirty-eight (76%) allowed counsel but
only in an advisory role, and two (4%) allowed counsel but only in a limited
role. Two schools (4%) denied the right to counsel completely.
Forty-two schools (84%) gave respondents the right to remain silent.
Three schools (6%) allowed the respondent to remain silent but explicitly
allowed an adverse inference to be drawn. The results were unknown for five
schools (10%).
Finally, all schools but one (2%) promised the right to appeal.
B. Comparison with Other Studies
This author is aware of only two articles published within the last thirty
years that have studied university procedural protections afforded to students
charged with misconduct. In 1999, Carl and Vivian Berger studied the
protections that state and private universities provided to students charged
with academic misconduct. 135 They sent letters to 222 public and private
universities selected at random and received responses from 159.136 Berger
135. Berger & Berger, supra note 63.
136. Id. at 296.
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and Berger found that 90% provided for a hearing before an impartial body 3
(as compared with forty-two = 84% here); 90% allowed the accused to remain
silent without an adverse finding of guilt'38 (as compared with forty-two =
84% now); and over 90% gave students the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses 3 9 (as compared with five = 10% that give the
right, and forty = 80% that give a limited right now). One area in which
universities have improved is the right to counsel. Berger and Berger found
that just 58% of the state schools surveyed allowed the advisor to be an
attorney 140 (as compared with forty-eight = 92% now that allowed lawyers in
at least some situations). Like now, those schools that did provide the right
to counsel often prohibited direct participation. 141
In 2002, Heather M. Karjane, Bonnie S. Fisher and Francis T. Cullen
studied how institutions of higher education (IHEs) adjudicate sexual
assault.14 2 They used a multi-faceted approach including a content analysis of
published sexual assault policy materials, email surveys of campus
administrators, and field research at eight colleges and universities. 14 Their
sample was comprised of 2,438 schools, and they received an overall
response rate of 41%.
Karjane et al. found that only 22.4% of schools mentioned the burden of
proof used in sexual assault cases (as compared with 100% now), and, of
those, 81.4% used preponderance of the evidence (as compared with 100%
now), 3.3% used beyond a reasonable doubt, and 15.3% used some other
standard. 144 They found that, of the 203 public four-year universities that
mentioned who decided if a student had violated the code of conduct, 82.3%
had judicial or disciplinary members make that decision as opposed to one
individual (as compared with thirty-seven = 74% now). 145 Of those
universities that described their proceedings, 68.5% mentioned cross-
examination (as compared with forty-one = 86% now), 146 but it was unclear
137. Id. at 297.
138. Id. at 298.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id at 297 98.
142. KARJANE, FISHER & CULLEN, supra note 64.
143. Id. at vi.
144. Id. attbl.6.12.
145. Id. attbl.6.11.
146. Note that this Article is classifying all schools with the investigatory model as not
allowing cross-examination. Suggesting questions to an investigator who will decide whether to
ask, and even if he does it will be outside of the accused's presence, does not qualify as cross-
examination.
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whether that included direct questioning of the complainant and/or whether
the complainant had to actually respond. 147 Furthermore, of the 74 four-year
public universities that mentioned the type of vote needed for a finding of
responsibility, 54% used majority; 2%% were unanimous, and the remaining
14% used something else. 148 The present study found that twenty-seven =
54% used a majority vote to determine responsibility; three = 6% required
consensus or unanimity; and five = 10% had one person to make the
determination.
The above comparison shows a mixed picture of how rights afforded to
accused students have changed over time. Some protections have been
reduced. In the past, more schools afforded students the right to a hearing.
The right to counsel, in contrast, has clearly improved. Although students
may not currently have a robust right to an attorney, at least most schools
give students the right to have an attorney as an advisor. Unfortunately, there
is not enough information to meaningfully analyze either the right to
confront/cross examine or the standard of proof over time. Karjane et al.
found that 68.5% mentioned cross-examination, but they do not specify
whether that means students at those institutions had the right to ask questions
and that the complainant had to respond. 149 If that is what their findings mean,
then the right has been significantly reduced. If they meant that students were
allowed to indirectly question the complainant who need not respond, then
more schools afford a limited right to cross-examine now.
In addition, some of the IHEs reported using a higher standard of proof
than preponderance, but most did not report what standard they were using.
It is possible that those that did not report actually used a lower standard (such
as probable cause), but it is more likely that the ambiguity operated to make
it even more difficult to find someone responsible because of the "traditional
bias against those who lodge claims of sexual assault generally, as well as the
bias against those who bring claims of campus acquaintance rape
specifically."' 150
147. KARJANE, FISHER & CULLEN, supra note 64, at tbl.6.9.
148. Id. attbl.6.12.
149. Id. at tbl.6.9.
150. Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L.
REv. 945, 1016 17 (2004).
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III. Do THESE PROCEDURES SATISFY PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS?
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in relevant
part, "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall .. .deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law."'' Since the
disciplinary proceedings of public universities clearly constitute state
action, 5 2 two questions must be answered: Does the punishment constitute a
deprivation of liberty or property, and if so, what procedural protections does
due process require?'53
A. Does the Punishment Constitute a Deprivation of Liberty or
Property?
In Goss v. Lopez, the U.S. Supreme Court held that public high school
students facing suspension had a property interest in their education as
guaranteed by Ohio law as well as a liberty interest in their good name. " In
support of its decision, the Court noted that since the "landmark" case of
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,'55 "lower federal courts have
uniformly held the Due Process Clause applicable to decisions made by tax-
supported educational institutions to remove a student from the institution
long enough for the removal to be classified as an expulsion. "156
151. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
152. See Duke v. N. Tex. State Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 837 (5th Cir. 1972).
153. See Tonya Robinson, Property Interests and Due Process in Public University and
Community College Student Disciplinary Proceedings, 30 SCH. L. BULL. 10, 10 (1999).
154. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). At first glance it may appear that students at
private universities would not have a procedural due process claim because their universities
would not be deemed state actors. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982), the
Supreme Court held that a private school had not acted under color of state law even though the
school had to comply with state regulations and over ninety percent of its funds were paid by the
state. The Court made it clear however that the actions of a private party would be attributable to
the state if "the private party acted in concert with state actors." Id. at 838 n.6. Because OCR has
mandated that all universities receiving federal funding lower protections, private universities are
acting in concert with state actors and thus there is state action. This author gathered data from
thirty-five private colleges and universities that will be discussed in Tamara Lave, A Critical Look
at How Private Universities Adjudicate Rape, 71 MIAMI L. REv. (forthcoming 2016).
155. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294. F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
156. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 n.8.
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Although the Court has never held that university students are entitled to
procedural due process, it explicitly assumed it in the cases of Board of
Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz'57 and Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Ewing.'58 In addition, other than the Seventh
Circuit,'59 all lower federal courts across the country have held, 6 or at least
157. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84 85 (1978) ("Assuming
the existence of a liberty or property interest, respondent has been awarded at least as much due
process as the Fourteenth Amendment requires.").
158. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222 23 (1985) ("But
remembering Justice Brandeis' admonition not to 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied,' . . . we again conclude, as we did
in Horowitz, that the precise facts disclosed by the record afford the most appropriate basis for
decision. We therefore accept the University's invitation to 'assume the existence of a
constitutionally protectible property right in [Ewing's] continued enrollment,' and hold that even
if Ewing's assumed property interest gave rise to a substantive right under the Due Process Clause
to continued enrollment free from arbitrary state action, the facts of record disclose no such
action.").
159. See Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.
2013) ("However, our circuit has rejected the proposition that an individual has a stand-alone
property interest in an education at a state university, including a graduate education."). But see
Medlock v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 1:11-cv-00977-TWP-DKL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44408, at
*19 21 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2013) (holding that a student's procedural due process rights were not
violated by a university disciplinary procedure).
160. Wells v. Columbus Tech. Coll., 510 F. App'x 893, 896 (11th Cir. 2013) ("As for
procedural due process, a student generally should be afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard before being suspended from a state school."); Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629,
633 (6th Cir. 2005) ("In this Circuit we have held that the Due Process Clause is implicated by
higher education disciplinary decisions."); Woodis v. Westark Cmty. Coll., 160 F.3d 435, 440
(8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted) ("We have indicated that procedural due process must
be afforded a student on the college campus 'by way of adequate notice, definite charge, and a
hearing with opportunity to present one's own side of the case and with all necessary protective
measures."'); Tellefsen v. Univ. of N.C. at Greensboro, No. 89-2665, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS
21332, at *3 (4th Cir. June 14, 1989) ("[A] student facing expulsion or suspension from a public
educational institution is entitled to the protections of due process."); Gorman v. Univ. of R.I.,
837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) ("It is also not questioned that a student's interest in pursuing an
education is included within the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property.");
Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) (concluding with "no difficulty" that a
nursing student had a property right in her education "and the more prominently so in that she
paid a specific, separate fee for enrollment and attendance at the Gordon Cooper School"); Dixon,
294 F.2d at 158 (holding that due process requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before
a student at a tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct); Bradley v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd.
of Regents of Se. Okla. State Univ., No. CIV-13-293-KEW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58576, at *7
(E.D. Okla. Apr. 28, 2014) ("[A] student facing expulsion or suspension from a public educational
institution is entitled to the protections of due process."); Oladokun v. Ryan, No. 06 cv 2330
(KMW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103381, at * 14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) ("It is well-settled that
due process concerns are implicated by the disciplinary decisions of public institutions of higher
education."); Phat Van Le v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., No. 08-991, 2009 U.S. Dist.
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presumed,'6 ' that students at public colleges and universities are entitled to
procedural due process.
Since the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that students at public
institutions are entitled to procedural due process, this question will be
explored. Although suspension or expulsion certainly constitutes a "grievous
loss '1162 for the accused, the Court has rejected the notion that the importance
of the benefit (here a college degree) determines whether it is property for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 163  Similarly, although the
reputational stigma associated with an allegation of sexual assault is
significant, the Court has made it clear that due process claims cannot rest on
harm to "reputation alone."' 164 Yet, university students still have a strong
argument that they are entitled to procedural due process when facing
suspension or expulsion.
To begin with, the Court has made it abundantly clear that "the property
interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual
ownership of real estate, chattels, or money. "165 In the companion cases of
Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, the Court considered
when the deprivation of a benefit falls under the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In both cases, the benefit at stake was employment, and the
specific issue was when a teacher had the right to hearing after his contract
was not renewed. 166
LEXIS 37672, at *23 (D.N.J. May 4, 2009) ("It is well-established that the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause apply to student disciplinary proceedings at public
institutions."); Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 15 (D. Me. 2005) ("Here, the
Plaintiffs were students at a public university and potentially subject to expulsion or suspension.
They are, therefore, entitled to the protections of due process.").
161. Lucey v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 380 F. App'x
608, 610 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted) ("On the facts alleged, Lucey's right to
procedural due process at the December 4 Hearing was satisfied because Lucey was subject to
sanctions less than suspension or expulsion and received 'some kind of notice and [was] afforded
some kind of hearing."').
162. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
163. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); see also Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). See generally Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme
Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CAL. L. REV. 146 (1983).
164. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). Some courts refer to this standard as
"stigma plus." See Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 63 (1st Cir. 1998).
165. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571 72 (internal citations omitted).
166. Roth concerned a teaching assistant who was hired for a fixed one year contract, and the
contract was not renewed. Id. at 566. Sindermann involved a teacher in the state college system
of the State of Texas under a system of one-year contracts for a ten-year period, from 1959-69.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. at 594. After Sindermann became involved in some public disputes with the
Board of Regents, his contract was not renewed. Id. at 595.
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The Court began its analysis in Roth by discussing previous cases in which
it had found that the contested benefit constituted property under the
Fourteenth Amendment. It explained at a general level what motivated the
decision in these cases:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than
a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of
property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a
purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an
opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims. 167
The Court also discussed how a benefit became a property interest. The
Court wrote:
[P]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution [but
instead] ... are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. 168
The Court then determined that Roth did not have a property interest in
his employment because his rights were created by his contract, and that
contract specifically stated that it would terminate on a certain date. 169 Under
no condition did it provide for renewal. 170
In Sindermann, the Court acknowledged a less formal ground for the
creation of a property interest. Although a written contract could provide a
clear property interest, so could one that is implied. The Court wrote, "[a]
person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes
if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his
claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.'' 17 1
Based on that definition the Court ruled that Sindermann had the right to
a hearing on the grounds that someone like Sindermann, "who has held his
position for a number of years, might be able to show from the circumstances
of this service-and from other relevant facts-that he has a legitimate claim
of entitlement to job tenure.' 172
167. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 578.
170. Id.
171. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601.
172. Id. at 602.
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Applying the reasoning from Roth and Sindermann, students facing
suspension or expulsion have a strong claim of entitlement to their education.
Although students get secondary benefits from attending college, like
learning and making friends, the principal reason people attend university is
to obtain a diploma, and schools explicitly refer to the benefits of a diploma
from their institution in recruiting students. For example, this author visited
the website of one of her alma maters, the University of California, Berkeley.
On the Admissions page was the following: "Come to UC Berkeley, the
world's premier public university. Study with Nobel laureate faculty at top
research facilities. Meet the best students from the United States and around
the globe. And graduate with a diploma that introduces you to a family of
more than 450,000 alumni.'' 3
Should a student decide they want to attend a certain school, they must go
through significant hurdles in applying. These include: paying a fee to have
their application considered, taking standardized tests, requesting and
obtaining letters of recommendation, being interviewed, and writing essays
explaining why they should be admitted.
Once an offer of admission is made and accepted, the university and
student have entered into a contract. The consideration for the contract is as
follows. The student will pay substantial fees to matriculate, and he promises
to take a minimum number of credits, maintain a certain grade point average,
and comply with specified rules of conduct. In return, he will be awarded a
degree. As Berger and Berger explained, "[t]he contract, formed when an
accepted student registers, arises from the mutual understanding that the
student who satisfactorily completes a program's academic requirements will
receive the appropriate degree.' 4
B. What Procedural Protections Does Due Process Require
Now that this Article has made the case for why students are entitled to
procedural due process before they can be suspended or expelled, the next
question is how much process is due. At a minimum, the Court held in Goss
that "the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have
and an opportunity to present his side of the story."' 75 Although the Court
173. See Be Berkeley, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS,
http://admissions.berkeley.edu/beberkeley (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
174. Berger & Berger, supra note 63, at 292.
175. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
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stopped short of requiring a school to provide the accused with counsel, the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to call his own
witnesses, 176 it emphasized the fact that it was only addressing short
suspensions, not exceeding ten days, "[1]onger suspensions or expulsions for
the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal
procedures.' Three years later, in Board of Curators of the University of
Missouri v. Horowitz, the Court made it clear that students facing disciplinary
action are entitled to more stringent procedural protections than those charged
with academic misconduct. 178
In determining whether the current protections are constitutionally
sufficient to protect students facing expulsion for sexual assault, the
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge will be employed. 179 But first, two
important caveats: This Article acknowledges that students are not entitled to
the same procedural protections as criminal defendants, 180 and that, even if
they were, "lawyer-based, adjudicatory, adversarial procedure"'' does not
provide a magic solution to the problem of innocent people being found
responsible for a rape they did not commit.'82 Yet in this current climate,
where colleges are under enormous pressure to comply with OCR's
interpretation of Title IX, this author believes that many have lost sight of
why process matters. Thus, this section will use the Eldridge test to make the
best possible argument for why universities should afford additional
procedural protections, even if some of them (like the right to counsel) are
probably not constitutionally required in a campus disciplinary proceeding.
In addition, it is important to recognize the problems with the Eldridge
test, especially as they may bear on the accused students' likelihood to
prevail. Jerry Mashaw famously criticized Eldridge because it views "the sole
176. Id. at 583.
177. Id. at 584.
178. 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978).
179. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
180. See Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Labeling
a school proceeding disciplinary in nature, however, does not mean that complete adherence to
the judicial model of decision-making is required."); Yench v. Stockmar, 483 F.2d 820, 823 (10th
Cir. 1973) ("Student disciplinary proceedings are not comparable to criminal proceedings.").
181. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 515 (1986).
182. Id. at 517 ("Adversarialism is a plausible mechanism for generating information leading
to acceptable outcomes and for validating individual dignity only when the adversaries are
roughly comparable when each side has similar resources. But, as is well known, many who
attempt strategic adversarial interaction have few resources, little information, and disloyal,
indifferent, or nonexistent agents .... When gross imbalances are commonplace and patent, a
belief in adversarialism has a hollow ring.").
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purpose of procedural protections as enhancing accuracy, and thus limits its
calculus to the benefits or costs that flow from correct or incorrect
decisions."'83 As a result, it undervalues bedrock constitutional interests like
dignity and equality. 8 4 For example, Mashaw criticized the Court for not
acknowledging that some decisions (like an adjudication that a person
committed sexual assault) are judgments of "considerable social
significance" and thus have "a substantial moral content." 185 Such decisions
require hearings that are "highly individualized and attentive to subjective
evidence."' 86 Other scholars continued on this theme contending that
Eldridge "ignores the dignitary value of additional process."'187
In addition, Eldridge requires courts to use a balancing test to reconcile
the different factors, a methodology that has been roundly criticized. As
Edward Rubin aptly put it, "[t]his reliance upon 'weight,' which is a useful
approach for dealing with bananas, leaves something to be desired where
factors such as those in Mathews are concerned."' 88 The cost benefit
apparatus has a way of "dwarfling] soft variables" and "ignor[ing]
complexities and ambiguities,"'89 which makes it difficult for individuals to
prevail. As Charles A. Reich put it: "Matthews v. Eldridge represents an
outlook that treats the government's claims as having greater urgency than
the claims of individuals-even when there is nothing to justify the
government claims."'9 °
Recently however, the Court has applied a less parched version of
Matthews v. Eldridge, one that shows greater concern for the individual
interests at stake. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 191 and subsequent cases involving
immigration and national security, application of the Matthews v. Eldridge
factors has "produced surprisingly rights-affirming outcomes."' 192 As Joseph
183. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 28, 48 (1976).
184. See id. at 49.
185. Id. at 51.
186. Id. at 52.
187. Stan Keillor, James H. Cohen & Mercy Changwesha, The Inevitable, ifUntrumpeted,
March Toward "Civil Gideon ", 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 469, 481 (2014).
188. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044,
1138 (1984).
189. Mashaw, supra note 183.
190. Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 731, 732 (1990).
191. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
192. Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47
CONN. L. REV. 879, 882 (2015).
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Landau explains, "The Court's recent rulings involving national security and
immigration . .. reveal a Court that is increasingly concerned with the
individual interests at stake and especially willing to intervene to ensure that
executive and legislative action not go unchecked.' 193
This author acknowledges that if the Eldridge factors are applied the way
they were in Eldridge itself, then courts are likely to uphold the DCL
influenced procedures. If the Court takes the approach that it used in Hamdi,
however, then students will have a better chance of prevailing.
C. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test
Mathews v. Eldridge dictates that in determining the requirements of due
process in a particular circumstance, three factors must be considered:
the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; ... the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 1
94
1. Factor One: Private Interest at Stake
Without question, the private interest at stake is significant. Being
suspended or expelled from university has profound consequences on a
person's well being. As the Fifth Circuit explained back in 1961:
It requires no argument to demonstrate that education is vital and,
indeed, basic to civilized society. Without sufficient education the
plaintiffs would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy
life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties
and responsibilities of good citizens .... It is most unlikely that a
public college would accept a student expelled from another public
college of the same state. Indeed, expulsion may well prejudice the
student in completing his education at any other institution. Surely
no one can question that the right to remain at the college in which
193. Id. at 925 26.
194. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
48:0637]
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL
the plaintiffs were students in good standing is an interest of
extremely great value. 9 '
Studies have shown that earning a college degree has been positively
linked to a multitude of benefits including better health, longer life, a more
fulfilling workplace, and higher lifetime earnings. 196 Graduating from college
is particularly important for those coming from disadvantaged backgrounds.
A 2011 study found, "the chances of achieving economic success are
independent of social background among those who attain a BA."' 197 Thus
being denied a college degree is a serious loss.
Furthermore, the reputational harm from being found to have committed
sexual assault is significant. 198 Sex offenders are modem day bogeymen, and
being adjudicated (or even accused) of being a rapist can destroy friendships
and eviscerate the kind of connections that lead to jobs and satisfying long-
term relationships, both romantic and fraternal. 199
John Doe experienced first hand what happens when a person is found
responsible for sexual misconduct. In 2014, Doe received a "Disiplinary
Warning" from Brandeis University, which left a permanent mark on his
educational record for "serious sexual transgressions.1"200 Brandeis students
"publicly taunted and accused (him) of rape."' 20 1 His internship employer
explained that he had been "made aware" of John's situation from "several
195. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
196. SANDY BAUM ET AL., EDUCATION PAYS 2013: THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 5 6 (2013),
https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/education-pays-2013-full-report.pdf; HOWARD
R. BOWEN, INVESTMENT IN LEARNING: THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL VALUE OF AMERICAN
HIGHER EDUCATION 45 50 (Johns Hopkins Press 1977); LARRY L. LESLIE & PAUL T. BRINKMAN,
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 37 (1988).
197. Florencia Torche, Is a College Degree Still the Great Equalizer? Intergenerational
Mobility Across Levels of Schooling in the United States, 117 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 763, 798 (2011)
("The finding is largely consistent across all indicators of socioeconomic standing: social class,
occupational status, individual earnings, and total family income.").
198. Ariel Kaminer, Accusers and the Accused, Crossing Paths at Columbia University,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/nyregion/accusers-and-the-
accused-crossing-paths-at-columbia.html? r=0.
199. Consequences of Registration and Community Notification Laws for Registrants and
Their Loved Ones, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11, 2007),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/usO907/8.htm.
200. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *9 10 (D. Mass. Mar.
31,2016).
201. Id. at 45.
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sources" and fired him.2"2 Doe also stopped receiving calls from an employer
who had promised to hire him only months before.0 3
2. Factor Two: The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Liberty and
the Value of Additional Safeguards
Next, courts must assess the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty due
to the procedures used, and the probable value of additional safeguards.
a. No Right to an Adjudicatory Hearing
The most concerning trend in university disciplinary proceedings is that
of universities moving from a formal, adjudicatory hearing to an
investigatory model in which a single person gathers and reviews evidence
and then on their own determines whether an assault occurred. The White
House has publicly applauded this approach because it seems to "encourage
reporting and bolster trust in the process, while at the same time safeguarding
an alleged perpetrator's right to notice and to be heard. ' 20 4 One administrator
indicated that training conducted by the Association of Title IX
Administrators (ATIXA) recommends against using hearing panels, which
means that the practice is likely to spread.20 5
Universities that have moved to the investigatory model insist that they
are providing students with a hearing. As another administrator explained:
The term hearing can mean different things. Some people would
think of a hearing as a single time where all of the parties and
witnesses show up and formally present evidence and each side has
an opportunity to present its case to a decision maker. We don't
have that. Our process involves an investigation in which the
investigator meets with both parties and witnesses at separate times,
and often times multiple times, and collects all of the relevant
evidence and makes a determination based on the evidence. Our
view is that this is a hearing.20 6
202. Id.
203. Id. at 45 46.
204. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, NOT
ALONE: THE FIRST REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM
SEXUAL ASSAULT 14(2014).
205. ASS'N OF TITLE IX ADM'RS, THE 2013 ATIXA CAMPUS TITLE IX COORDINATOR AND
ADMINISTRATOR TRAINING & CERTIFICATION COURSE MATERIALS 91 (2013).
206. Telephone Interview with University Administrator (Mar. 5, 2015).
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Providing accused students with an opportunity to present their case to an
investigator may constitute a hearing in some technical sense, but it misses
important procedural protections including the right to an impartial fact-
finder. As the Court acknowledged in Withrow v. Larkin, a "fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process"20 and it applies to both court
cases and hearings before administrative agencies. 20 8 "Not only is a biased
decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable," the Court wrote, "but 'our
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness. '209
Congress recognized the importance of role separation when it
unainmously passed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946.210 The
APA specifically bars an individual from performing both an investigatory
and an adjudicatory role.21' Section 554(d)(2) states that a hearing officer
"may not be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an
employee or agent engaged in the performance or investigative or prosecution
functions for an agency. "212 The firewall was strengthened in 1976 with the
passage of Section 557(d), 213 and so now the law states:
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative
or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or
a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision,
recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557
of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. 214
The APA's separation of roles was not mere happenstance. When
President Roosevelt appointed a committee in 1939 to study "existing
(administrative) practices and procedures ' 215, one of the the "most intense"
attacks was on the combining of roles at formal adjudication.216 Then state
judge and future Supreme Court Justice William Brennan eloquently
expressed the concern in a concurring opinon to a 1952 case:
207. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)).
208. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973).
209. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
210. See Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L.
REv. 219, 231 32 (1986) (internal citations omitted). I am indebted to Ed Rubin for this point.
211. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554 (d)(2), 557 (2012).
212. See id. § 554(d)(2).
213. Pub. L. No. 94 409, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 1246 (1976).
214. Administrative Procedure Act §554(d)(2).
215. Louis L. Jaffe, The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 402 (1941).
216. Id. at 418.
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Concern with the problem of merger of the powers of prosecutor
and judge in the same agency springs from the fear that the agency
official adjudicating upon private rights cannot wholly free himself
from the influences toward partiality inherent in his identification
with the investigative and prosecuting aspects of the case; in other
words, that the atmosphere in which he must make his judgments is
not conducive to the critical detachment toward the case expected
of the judge. In a sense the combination of functions violates the
ancient tenet of Anglo-American justice that "No man shall be a
judge in his own cause." "The litigant often feels that, in this
combination of functions within a single tribunal or agency, he has
lost all opportunity to argue his case to an unbiased official and that
he has been deprived of safeguards that he has been taught to
revere. "217
Although the Court has held that combining investigatory and
adjudicatory functions does not necessarily violate due process, the cases in
which it upheld the combination of functions differ in important ways from
the university proceedings at issue here. In FTC v. Cement Institute, the Court
held that it did not violate due process to have FTC Commission Members
who had investigated cases later adjudicate them.218 Central to the Court's
holding, however, was the fact that the adjudicatory nature of the hearing
helped to prevent Members from being biased:
[T]he fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the
result of its prior ex parte investigations did not necessarily mean
that the minds of its members were irrevocably closed on the subject
of the respondents' basing point practices. Here, in contrast to the
Commission's investigations, members of the cement industry were
legally authorized participants in the hearings. They produced
evidence-volumes of it. They were free to point out to the
Commission by testimony, by cross-examination of witnesses, and
by arguments, conditions of the trade practices under attack which
they thought kept these practices within the range of legally
permissible business activities.
In Withrow, the Court held that it did not violate due process to have a
hearing board investigate allegations of wrongdoing and then decide to
suspend the person's medical license.220 The Court emphasized that the
217. In re Larsen, 86 A.2d 430, 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1952) (internal citations omitted).
218. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 03 (1948).
219. Id. at 701 (alteration in original).
220. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 56 (1975).
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standard of proof was low (probable cause), and that the suspension was only
temporary. 221 Most importantly, the accused would have the right to a full
adjudicatory hearing before his license could be suspended permanently.222
The level of process that helps to protect against bias in both FTC v
Cement Institute and Withrowis nonexistent in the investigatory model. The
accused student does not have the right to be present for witness testimony,
and he is explicitly prohibited from asking direct questions. Furthermore, the
standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence, and the investigator is
often making the final determination as to whether a violation occurred. In
addition, we know a lot more than we did in 1975 about the way that bias
affects judgment and decisionmaking. As will be discussed below, implicit
bias and confirmation bias pose profound fairness problems for the
investigatory model of adjudication.
b. Implicit Bias
Part of the problem with putting everything in the hands of one person is
that even an administrator with the best of intentions is almost certainly
biased in some way.223 This poses a concern not just for accused students but
the student who alleges that she has been raped. Implicit biases (or
unconscious stereotypes) have been shown to affect judgment and produce
discriminatory behavior.224 These include biases based on race, gender,
ethnicity, nationality, social status, and weight. Although this author is not
aware of any studies on implicit bias in campus disciplinary proceedings,
numerous studies have shown its effect in the criminal setting. For instance,
unconscious racial discrimination has been shown to affect prosecutors
charging decisions in homicide cases (black people were more likely than
white people to face the death penalty for similar conduct) 225 and jurors'
221. Id. at 56 59.
222. See id. at 37 n.1.
223. For a comprehensive overview of studies showing bias in the courtroom, see Jerry Kang
et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124 (2012).
224. See John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A
Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies
that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RESEARCH ORG. BEHAV. 39, 51 (2009).
225. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide
Cases, 19 L. & Soc'Y REV. 587, 617 618 (1985).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
READY, FIRE, AIM
willingness to convict black defendants. 226 Researchers have also found that
judges hold implicit racial biases, and that it can influence their rulings.227
So how should these biases be countered? Specialized training has been
shown to reduce bias228 as has a longstanding and deep personal commitment
to eradicating personal bias.229 Ironically, the commitment to be objective
may just exacerbate the problem. Studies have shown that subjects who
profess to be objective are more likely to make biased decisions.230
Changing the context in which people are rendering decisions, however,
may be the most effective way of promoting objectivity. Specifically, a larger
and more diverse hearing body has been shown to increase the quality of
deliberation and reduce bias. One study looked at the effects of having a
racially homogeneous versus a heterogeneous jury.23' It found that on every
relevant measure, racially heterogeneous groups outperformed homogeneous
ones. Not only did racially mixed groups spend more time deliberating, but
also they discussed a wider range of case facts and personal perspectives.
They also made fewer factual errors than all-white juries.232 This finding
means that universities should be increasing and diversifying the number of
decision makers not reducing them down to one person.
226. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, "Race Salience" in Juror Decision-
Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 599,
601 (2009). These effects were only detected in race neutral trials. When the trial was racially
charged, researchers did not see this effect. The theory for this difference is that of "aversive
racism," or the idea that whites are loath to appear racist, and so they are especially vigilant in
racially charged settings. Id. at 601.
227. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1208 (2009).
228. Id. at 1227.
229. Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconsciously Controlling Stereotyping: Implicitly
Activated Egalitarian Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotypes, 18 Soc. COGNITION 151, 155
(2000).
230. Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, "I Think It, Therefore It's True": Effects of
Self-Perceived Objectivity on Hiring Discrimination, 104 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 207, 210 11 (2007).
231. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 597, 597 (2006).
232. A diverse hearing body has another benefit. Ultimately, whoever is deciding the case
must assess the credibility of witnesses, which can be difficult when people come from different
cultures. See Aldert Vrij, Why Professionals Fail to Catch Liars and How They Can Improve, 9
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 159, 167 (2004).
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c. Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias-the tendency for people to seek or interpret evidence
in a manner that is partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or an existing
hypothesis 233-poses a particular challenge to the fairness of the investigatory
model. Confirmation bias has "proven strikingly robust across diverse
domains of human thinking, including logical problem solving, social
interaction and medical reasoning. "234 Nickerson described the phenomenon
in his oft-cited 1998 article:
A great deal of empirical evidence supports the idea that the
confirmation bias is extensive and strong and that it appears in many
guises. The evidence also supports the view that once one has taken
a position on an issue, one's primary purpose becomes that of
defending or justifying that position. This is to say that regardless
of whether one's treatment of evidence was evenhanded before the
stand was taken, it can become highly biased afterward.235
Researchers have also shown how confirmation bias can infect criminal
investigations. Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky demonstrated that
interrogators who had been cued to believe that most suspects were guilty
chose more guilt-presumptive questions, used more interrogation techniques
(including the presentation of false evidence), were more aggressive in
questioning innocent suspects, and more likely to view a suspect as guilty.236
They also found that an interrogator's presumption of guilt affected the
behavior of those being questioned and made impartial observers more likely
to judge them guilty.23 Ask and Granhag found that experienced
investigators judged witness statements differently depending on whether the
statement was consistent or inconsistent with their initial theory. 238 Although
Ask, Rebelius, and Granhag showed that investigators will be more receptive
to certain kinds of evidence (such as DNA), the kind of evidence that is most
233. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,
2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
234. Karl Ask et al., The 'Elasticity' of Criminal Evidence: A Moderator of Investigator Bias,
22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1245, 1246 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
235. Nickerson, supra note 233, at 177.
236. Saul M. Kassin, Christine C. Goldstein & Kenneth Savitsky, Behavioral Confirmation
in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 187
(2003).
237. Id.
238. Karl Ask & Par Anders Granhag, Motivational Bias in Criminal Investigators'
Judgments of Witness Reliability, 37 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 561, 579 (2007).
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likely to be proffered at college adjudicatory hearings, witness testimony, is
the most subject to confirmation bias.239
Confirmation bias means that the accused student is unlikely to be treated
fairly when the same person who is conducting the investigation will also be
rendering the final determination in the case. 24' As the court explained in Doe
v. Brandeis University:
The dangers of combining in a single individual the power to
investigate, prosecute, and convict, with little effective power of
review, are obvious. No matter how well-intentioned, such a person
may have preconceptions and biases, may make mistakes, and may
reach premature conclusions.24'
Although investigators may begin their analysis with an impartial
perspective, once they believe that the accused either did or did not commit
the act in question, they may be unable to fully consider conflicting evidence.
Admittedly, confirmation bias poses a problem for the fairness and accuracy
of all investigations and adjudications, but at least in an adversarial hearing
the accused has the chance to present his defense before a person/persons
who have not already considered the evidence and come to a judgment.
This author acknowledges that ten years as an ardent deputy public
defender makes it difficult to imagine a non adversarial legal system. Yet as
Bob Kagan demonstrated convincingly in his influential book, Adversarial
Legalism, the United States' reliance on "lawyer-dominant litigation" for
"policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution" is unique in
the world.242 And though the American system can be a potent way of
vindicating rights,243 it comes at a significant price-it is expensive,
cumbersome, unpredictable, unequal, and often excessively punitive.244 In
contrast, other countries have avoided these problems and achieved higher
levels of legal certainty at significantly less cost by using a bureaucratic,
inquisitorial system in which trained judges dominate the evidence-gathering
239. Karl Ask et al., supra note 234, at 1257 58.
240. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, the author also believes that students
should be able to participate in disciplinary proceedings because they add needed diversity to the
panel and their involvement increases the legitimacy of the campus disciplinary proceedings.
241. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *36 (D. Mass. Mar.
31,2016).
242. See 2 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 7
(2003).
243. See id at 19 25.
244. Id. at 25 33, 62 68.
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and decision-making processes.245 Importantly, however, even those like
Christopher Slobogin who support a more inquisitorial model of adjudication
seem to agree that the investigator must be separated from the fact-finder.246
d. No Right to Evidence
The DCL orders universities not to let a respondent review the
complainant's statement unless she can read his.24 The Francisco Sousa case
demonstrates the way that this policy works in some universities. San Diego
State University refused to turn over the complainant's statement (indeed any
evidence in the case) because Sousa had not given a formal enough account
about what happened.248 Apparently the professions of innocence that he
made in person and through his attorney were insufficient. Making notice
contingent on first meeting some nebulous standard 249 significantly interferes
with the accused knowing what he is alleged to have done, and without this
information, he cannot decide which evidence or witnesses to introduce, and
thus he cannot fully defend himself.
e. No Right to Question the Complainant
Not giving the accused the right to question his accuser seriously impairs
his right to a fair and accurate determination of responsibility. In Goldberg v.
Kelley, the Supreme Court wrote that in almost every proceeding "where
important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. "250 The right
to ask questions is not a mere formality; the Court has called cross-
examination "the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth."' 251 As the court in Doe v. Brandeis University explained, cross-
examination is particularly important in credibility contests where there are
245. Id. at7, 11,239-41.
246. See Christopher Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REv. 699, 713
(2014).
247. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31, at 11 12.
248. Dorian Hargrove, San Diego Universities Botch Sexual Assault Investigations, SAN
DIEGO READER (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2015/sep/02/san-diego-
universities-botch-sexual-assault-invest/#.
249. How detailed must the statement be? Must the accused discuss the entire history
between the parties or just the incident in question? Must he discuss everything the complainant
did, and if so, how can he do that if he hasn't read her statement?
250. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
251. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
158 (1970)). Note that some venerable scholars disagree with the truth-seeking function of direct
questioning, including, Christopher Slobogin. See Slobogin, supra note 246, at 705 07, 712.
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no witnesses or other extrinsic evidence.252 Yet as this Article has shown, the
vast majority of universities studied do not give an accused student the right
to directly question his accuser. Under almost all the procedures studied, the
accused must direct his questions through the panel, which may choose
whether or not to ask. Even if they do ask, the complainant need not answer.
On July 10, 2015, San Diego Superior Court Judge Joel Pressman held
that a University of California San Diego student suspended for a year for
sexual assault was denied the right to a fair hearing because of procedures
just like those used at many of the flagship state universities.253 The court
ruled that a barricade (which many universities now use) should not have
been used to shield the accuser because there was no evidence that Doe was
hostile to her.254 The court also noted "the importance [of] demeanor and non-
verbal communication in order to properly evaluate credibility. This is
especially true given that the panel made findings in this case from Ms. Roe's
testimony and her credibility. ' 255 Finally, the court held that allowing the
panel chair to review the student's questions before being asked was unfair
and that denying him the right to ask several questions "deprived petitioner
the opportunity to examine anything about the summary conclusions relied
upon by the hearing panel. '256 In particular, the court did not approve of the
panel prohibiting Doe from questioning Ms. Roe about text messages
regarding their relationship after the incident in question, which Roe had
denied.25
Social science supports the importance courts place in cross-examination.
Although researchers have shown people are not very good at judging a
person's veracity based on his demeanor, 258 cross-examination is still animportant vehicle for discerning truth. 259 This is because a witness's cognitive
limitations make it demonstrably more difficult for him to consistently
252. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *35 (D. Mass. Mar.
31,2016).
253. Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL,
2015 WL 4394597, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015).
254. Id. at *2.
255. Id. at *3.
256. Id.
257. Id. at *2.
258. See Vrij, supra note 232, at 166 67; see also Bella M. De Paulo et al., Cues to
Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74 (2003) (conducting a meta-analysis of 120 independent
samples and finding that behavior commonly associated with deception such as unwillingness to
maintain eye contact were not in fact related).
259. See Raymond LaMagna, Note, (Re)Constitutionalizing Confrontation: Reexamining
Unavailability and the Value ofLive Testimony, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1506 (2006).
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answer spontaneous questions under live cross-examination if he is being
insincere.260 In addition, there is certain observable behavior that has been
linked to deception, such as vocal tension and pitch.261 At least one study has
shown that subjects are more than twice as effective at detecting deception
when they are able to observe a speaker's body and hear his voice as opposed
to simply reviewing a written transcript.262 Thus screens should only be used
when absolutely necessary and only to shield the complainant from the
accused, not from those who will be deciding whether an assault took place.
f LimitedRight to Counsel
The vast majority of universities give students the right to retain counsel,
but it is almost always an abridged right.263 Counsel must play a silent role,
meaning that she is not allowed to question witnesses or address the hearing
in any way. Denying students the right to have active representation creates
a real danger that innocent people will be found responsible.
When a university is deciding whether to allow more robust
representation, it should consider why the right to counsel is enshrined in the
6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This Article is not contending that
what is at stake in a college disciplinary proceeding is anywhere akin to that
of a criminal trial, but it still helps to remember why counsel is a fundamental
right. As the Supreme Court wrote in Argersinger v. Hamlin, "[t]he assistance
of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial. '264 This is
because of the "obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with
power to take his life or liberty .. "265 In Powell v. Alabama, Justice
Sutherland explained why even innocent people need a lawyer: "Without [the
guiding hand of counsel], though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 266
Of course, university grievance procedures are not as complicated as jury
trials. For instance, university tribunals do not require participants to know
the federal or state rules of evidence. But helping students navigate
260. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57
STAN. L. REV. 291, 332 44 (2004).
261. See De Paulo et al., supra note 258 at 95 96.
262. See Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should)
Make Decisions, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 21 22 (1997).
263. Supra Section ILA, Table 6.
264. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
265. Johnstonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 63 (1938).
266. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
680 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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complicated proceedings is not the only purpose of an attorney. Lawyers also
aid those who are uncomfortable speaking in public because they may be shy,
have difficult thinking on their feet, or lack proficiency in English. For these
students, not having an attorney creates a Hobson's choice. Remain silent but
forsake the opportunity for vigorous self-defense, or speak but run the risk
that they be judged a liar. This conundrum is especially ironic because the
stress of public speaking is likely to exacerbate classic symptoms of
nervousness like gaze aversion and fidgeting, which many wrongly believe
are indicative of deception.2 67
Lawyers may be especially important for students who are in categories
of accused more likely to be found responsible based solely on what they look
like. Studies show that unattractive defendants receive significantly longer
sentences for the same crime as compared with attractive defendants, and
African Americans are given longer sentences than whites. 268 Research
suggests that if a defendant has a face considered to be more consistent with
the charged offense, he is more likely to be convicted of that crime than a
person with a face that does not match. 269 This has been found to be true
regardless of the strength of the evidence.270 A good lawyer can help to offset
these biases through effective advocacy, such as by bringing out important
facts or pointing out possible credibility issues.
g. Standard of proof-Preponderance of the Evidence
All of the flagship state universities are known to have adopted
"preponderance of the evidence" as their standard of proof. As one university
administrator explained, "preponderance of the evidence is 50% plus a
feather."'271 Although this standard almost certainly meets the minimal
requirements of procedural due process, this Article contends that universities
should use a higher standard of proof given the seriousness of the allegations
and the potential consequences.
267. See Lucy Akehurst et al., Lay Persons' and Police Officers' Beliefs Regarding
Deceptive Behavior, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 461, 462 (1996); Vrij, supra note 232, at
162.
268. Andrea DeSantis & Wesley A. Kayson, Defendants' Characteristics of Attractiveness,
Race, and Sex and Sentencing Decisions, 81 PSYCHOL. REP. 679, 682 (1997).
269. A.G. Goldstein et al., Facial Stereotypes of Good Guys and Bad Guys: A Replication
andExtension, 22 BULL. OF PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 549, 551 52 (1984); A.D. Yarmey, Stereotypes
and Recognition Memory for Faces and Voices for Good Guys and Bad Guys, 7 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 419, 419 (1993).
270. R. Dumas & B. Teste, The Influence of Criminal Facial Stereotypes on Juridic
Judgements, 65 Swiss J. PSYCHOL. 237 (2006).
271. Telephone Interview with University Administrator (Jan. 24, 2014).
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In determining whether a feather should be enough to tip the scales in a
campus disciplinary proceeding for rape, it helps to remember what purpose
the standard of proof plays. In Addington v. Texas, the Court said that the
function of the standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of
factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. ' 272 Setting a high or
low standard is a way "to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and
to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision." '273
The Court then differentiated between types of cases across the spectrum.
At one end lies the archetypal civil case involving a pecuniary dispute
between private parties. "Since society has a minimal concern with the
outcome of such private suits, plaintiff's burden of proof is a mere
preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in
roughly equal fashion. ",274 This is contrasted with criminal cases in which "the
interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without
any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards
of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an
erroneous judgment."'275 Because so much is at stake, the state has the burden
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a way of guaranteeing
"our society imposes almost the entire risk of error on itself."276
In the middle are cases that use the intermediate standard of clear and
convincing evidence. This standard is typically used in civil cases involving
"quasi-criminal wrongdoing" like fraud. The rationale for this intermediate
standard is that the interests at stake are "more substantial than mere loss of
money."' 278 For that reason, "some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to
the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing
the plaintiffs burden of proof."'2 79 The Court noted that it also used this higher
standard in certain civil proceedings as a way of "protect[ing] particularly
important individual interests. '28" The Court mentioned deportation and
272. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370
(1970)).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 424.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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denaturalization, and in Addington it held that civil commitment also requires
this higher standard of proof.28'
The question then is where a university adjudication of sexual assault falls
on this spectrum. Many have argued that the standard of proof should be
preponderance of the evidence.282 They contend that this lower standard
adequately protects the accused, 83 while at the same time making it easier for
victims whose only evidence is their word to lodge complaints.284 Finally,
some maintain that preponderance is the right standard because it treats the
interests of the accused student, the victimized student, and the entire student
body as equally important.2 85
A person will not go to jail if he is found to have violated the school of
conduct, but his life is still likely to be gravely affected. This is particularly
true now that OCR has prohibited schools from reaching any kind of informal
settlement in sexual assault cases, even at the request of the victim2 8 6 and
OCR has made it clear that any punishment short of suspension or expulsion
is inadequate. Although the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) generally prohibits the improper disclosure of personally
identifiable information obtained from education records, there are
exceptions for crimes of violence.28 Universities may notify the victim of the
outcome of the proceedings, 288 and they are allowed to disclose to third parties
when they find a student has committed rape or sexual assault. 9  Some
universities mark official transcripts to indicate that the person committed
non-academic misconduct. 2 "9 Although some students have the savvy and
resources to transfer to another school after being expelled, many do not.
281. Id. at 432.
282. See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L.
REv. 945, 1016 17 (2004); Edward N. Stoner II & John Wesley Lowery, Navigating Past the
"Spirit of Insubordination ": A Twenty-First Century Model Student Conduct Code with a Model
Hearing Script, 31 J.C. & U.L. 1, 48 (2004); Mathew R. Triplett, Note, Sexual Assault on College
Campuses: Seeking the Appropriate Balance Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62
DuKE L.J. 487, 516 19 (2012); Weizel, supra note 46.
283. Triplett, supra note 282; Weizel, supra note 46.
284. Anderson, supra note 282, at 1016.
285. Stoner & Lowery, supra note 282, at 48 49.
286. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31, at 8.
287. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(13) (14), (16) (2012).
288. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(13).
289. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(14).
290. Collin Binkley et al., Students Easily Transfer After Violent Offenses, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014, 8:05 AM),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/11/24/hidden-on-campus.html.
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Without an undergraduate degree, a person's earning potential and career
opportunities are significantly curtailed.
Furthermore, requiring that the standard of proof be set at preponderance
means that some schools have a lower standard of proof for allegations of
sexual harassment or assault than for other offenses.29 ' As the Massachusetts
District Court observed in Doe v. Brandeis University, intentionally making
it easier to find men responsible for sexual assault compared to other
misconduct is particularly problematic in light of the elimination of other
basic procedural rights of the accused:
The standard of proof in sexual misconduct cases at Brandeis is
proof by a "preponderance of the evidence." For virtually all other
forms of alleged misconduct at Brandeis, the more demanding
standard of proof by "clear and convincing evidence" is employed.
The selection of a lower standard (presumably, at the insistence of
the United States Department of Education) is not problematic,
standing alone; that standard is commonly used in civil proceedings,
even to decide matters of great importance. Here, however, the
lowering of the standard appears to have been a deliberate choice
by the university to make cases of sexual misconduct easier to
prove-and thus more difficult to defend, both for guilty and
innocent students alike. It retained the higher standard for virtually
all other forms of student misconduct. The lower standard may thus
be seen, in context, as part of an effort to tilt the playing field against
accused students, which is particularly troublesome in light of the
elimination of other basic rights of the accused.292
3. Factor Three: Government Interest and Burdens of Additional
Protections
Under the final Eldridge factor, courts must consider the governmental
interest at stake and the burdens of additional protections.
a. Preventing Sexual Assault
The primary function of universities is to provide an education, 293 and Title
IX recognized that this end could not be achieved unless women are free from
sexual discrimination and assault. The consequences of sexual assault endure
291. See supra Table 1.
292. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *37 (D. Mass. Mar.
31,2016).
293. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1988).
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long beyond the physical injury; victims report feeling the psychological and
emotional consequences many years after the attack occurred. Studies show
that between 32% and 70% of rape survivors develop PTSD, and 38% to 43%
meet the criteria for major depression.294
In addition, at least one study found that being the victim of sexual assault
had a negative impact on academic success.295 Specifically, researchers found
that women who were sexually assaulted during their first semester of
university tended to have a lower GPA by the end of the semester as
compared with women who had not experienced sexual assault during that
first semester.296 Importantly, however, it appears that the negative impact did
not last long; researchers found that these same women did not have a lower
GPA at the end of their second semester as compared with those who had not
been sexually assaulted.29 Finally, the study found that the more traumatic
the sexual assault, the more dramatic the impact on academic performance. 298
Thus it is clear that universities have an interest and a responsibility in
preventing sexual assault, but at the same time, it is important not to
misrepresent the extent of the problem. OCRjustified the procedural changes
in the DCL in part on the notion that female college students were at
particular risk of being sexually assaulted. A study by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics found the opposite to be true, that college students are less likely to
be raped or sexually assaulted than their peers.299
The incidence of sexual assault should also not be overstated. As
mentioned at the beginning of this Article, OCR cited a study by NIJ in
support of its claim that "[t]he statistics on sexual violence are both deeply
troubling and a call to action for the nation."3 ' Yet the one in five study only
reported the findings from a sample size of two universities, and they were
not nationally representative. Indeed on December 15, 2014, Christopher
Krebs and Christine Lindquist, the lead researchers of the NIJ study published
a piece in Time Magazine in which they wrote:
294. Dean G. Kilpatrick & Ron Acierno, Mental Health Needs of Crime Victims:
Epidemiology and Outcomes, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 119, 126 27 (2003); Mary P. Koss,
Restoring Rape Survivors: Justice, Advocacy, and a Call to Action, 1087 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
ScI. 206, 221 (2006); Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., Rape Related PTSD: Issues and Interventions,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, June 1, 2007, at 50.
295. See Carol E. Jordan et al., An Exploration of Sexual Victimization and Academic
Performance Among College Women, 15 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 191, 196 (2014).
296. Jordan et al., supra note 295, at 191.
297. Id. at 196.
298. Id. at 197.
299. SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 34.
300. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31, at 2.
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[T]he 1-in-5 statistic is not a nationally representative estimate of
the prevalence of sexual assault, and we have never presented it as
being representative of anything other than the population of senior
undergraduate women at the two universities where data were
collected-two large public universities, one in the South and one
in the Midwest.3"'
The 2015 Association of American Universities Campus Climate Survey
though often cited,30 2 has similar limitations. That study found one in four
women surveyed from twenty-seven Institutes of Higher Education (IHEs)
had been raped or sexually assaulted while in college.30 3 Yet the authors
explicitly stated that the results were not nationally representative and that
saying otherwise, "is at least oversimplistic, if not misleading. 30 4
But the Campus Climate Survey may be flawed even with the sample it
purports to represent. The study had just a 19.3 % response rate, which means
that the results could be biased upwards. As the authors acknowledged, if
victims are more likely to respond to a survey on sexual assault then the
results would be biased to overestimate the amount of rape and sexual
assault. To test this, they conducted three different assessments of non-
response bias. The results weren't good: "Two of these three analyses provide
evidence that nonresponders tended to be less likely to report victimization.
This implies that the survey estimates related to victimization and selected
attitude items may be biased upwards (i.e., somewhat too high)." 30 6
As a point of comparison, the National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) published a study in 2014 that found between 1995 and 2013, 6.1
per 1,000 women in post secondary institutions were the victims of rape or
301. Christopher Krebs & Christine Lindquist, Setting the Record Straight on 'I in 5', TIME,
(Dec. 15, 2014), http://time.com/3633903/campus-rape-I-in-5-sexual-assault-setting-record-
straight/.
302. See Michele Gorman, 1 in 4 Women Experienced Sexual Assault While in College
Survey Finds, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 21, 2015, 4:26 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/1-4-women-
sexual-assault-college-374793; Richard Pdrez-Pefia, 1 in 4 Women Experience Sex Assault on
Campus, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/us/a-third-of-
college-women-experience-unwanted-sexual-contact-study-finds.html? r=0; Kelly Wallace,
23% of Women Report Sexual Assault in College, Survey Finds, CNN (Sept 23, 2015, 8:43 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/22/health/campus-sexual-assault-new-large-survey/.
303. See DAVID CANTOR ET AL., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL
ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, 23 26 (2015),
https://www.aau.edu/uploadedFiles/AAU- Publications/AAU -Reports/Sexual Assault Campus
_Survey/AAUCampusClimateSurvey 12 14 15.pdf.
304. Id. at xv.
305. Id. atvi vii.
306. Id.
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sexual assault.3 7 These results were nationally representative. Although the
NCVS has a large sample size and very high response rate (historically
between 86-91%),3"8 it has been criticized for likely underestimating the
incidence of rape and sexual assault.30 9 Importantly, the NCVS did find that
women between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four had a higher rate of
rape and sexual assault than those in any other age group. 310 The NCVS also
highlighted the intractability of the problem; it reported that the rate of sexual
assault among female college students did not differ significantly from one
year to the next between 1997 and 2013. 3"
Since universities have such different incidences of sexual assault, it isn't
clear why a one shoe fits all policy should be instituted. Why is OCR
requiring all schools to change their procedural protections when all schools
do not have a problem with rape? Where is the evidence that there is any
correlation between the level of procedural protections and the incidence of
rape and sexual assault?
Furthermore, whatever the rate of sexual assault, it is an open question
whether lowering procedural protections actually furthers the government's
interest in protecting women. It is true that some universities have an
appalling record of punishing rape and sexual assault,3 12 but as the Erica
Kinsman case showed, lowering the standard of proof does not necessarily
solve the problem. More to the point, states across the country were able to
increase reporting and prosecution of rape without lowering procedural
protections.313 They did it by instituting reforms that included: changing
evidentiary standards (many states had previously required a witness to
corroborate the allegation), redefining the crime of rape to include more than
just vaginal/penile penetration, eliminating the resistance requirement and
creating rape shield statutes, which barred evidence about the victim's dress
307. SINOzICH & LANGTON, supra note 34, at 4.
308. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DiV. ON BEHAVIOR & SOC. ScI. & EDUC., ESTIMATING
THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 55 (Candace Kruttschnitt et al. eds., 2014).
309. Id. at 4.
310. SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 34, at 3.
311. Id.
312. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Concealing Campus Sexual Assault: An Empirical
Examination, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1, 6 (2015); Binkley et al., supra note 290; Kristen
Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for Sexual Assault, THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (July 14,
2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/02/24/4360/lack-consequences-sexual-
assault.
313. See Jody Clay-Warner & Callie Harbin Burt, Rape Reporting After Reforms: Have
Times Really Changed?, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 150, 165 (2005) (finding that a rape
occurring after 1989 was eighty-eight percent more likely to be reported than a rape that happened
before 1975, which was when rape reforms began).
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or prior sexual history unless a judge found that it was particularly relevant
to the facts of the case.314 Importantly, however, researchers found that
although reporting of aggravated rape (defined as stranger rape, use of a
weapon, or resulting in injury) 315 went up, there was no change to reporting
of simple rape.31 6 Since a college campus is more likely to involve rape
between people who know each other, the reforms described above may not
increase reporting. Instead colleges will have to take other measures, which
will be described in greater detail below.3'
One obvious first step, however, is curbing the consumption of alcohol on
campus because it has been shown to play a major role in sexual assault.3 8
Schools must also identify and get control of high-risk sports teams and
fraternities that report higher levels of hostility and sexual aggression towards
women.319 Outside the university, police departments need to take so-called
date rape more seriously, and universities must support those women who do
want to report to the police.
b. Fair proceedings
The university also has a "vital interest" in fair proceedings because they
"serve[] the goals of both students and schools alike. ' 320 Finding an innocent
person responsible for rape means the university will unnecessarily lose that
person's tuition as well as any contribution they would otherwise make to the
community, such as through participation in sports or student government. If
the case was one of mistaken identification then a wrongful finding means
that there will still be a dangerous person at large on campus.
On a more general level, ensuring that disciplinary proceedings are fair
may actually promote community safety by increasing respect for campus
rules. Although many believe that it is the threat or use of punishment that
314. CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM 20 29 (1992).
315. Clay-Warner & Burt, supra note 313, at 169.
316. Id. at 167.
317. See Meichun Mohler-Kuo et al., Correlates of Rape While Intoxicated in a National
Sample of College Women, 9 J. oF STUD. ONALCOHOL 37, 37 38 (2004) (discussing that one issue
colleges should address is intoxication).
318. See id.
319. Stephen E. Humphrey & Arnold S. Kahn, Fraternities, Athletic Teams, and Rape:
Importance of Identification with a Risky Group, 15 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1313, 1320
(2000); see Sarah K. Murnen & Marla H. Kohlman, Athletic Participation, Fraternity
Membership, and Sexual Aggression Among College Men: A Meta-Analytic Review, 57 SEX
ROLES 145, 145 48 (2007).
320. Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 14 15 (lst Cir. 1988).
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shapes compliance with the law,32' social psychologists like Tom Tyler
contend that legitimacy is a more powerful force. "Legitimacy is a feeling of
obligation to obey the law and to defer to the decisions made by legal
authorities."322 In his 1990 book Why People Obey the Law, Tyler argued that
the basis of legitimacy is procedural justice.323 Subsequent research laid out
the six components of procedural justice: representation (the belief to which
parties believe they had the opportunity to take part in the decision-making
process), consistency (similarity of treatment over time and as compared with
like parties), impartiality (when the legal authority is unbiased), accuracy
(ability to make competent, high quality decisions which includes the public
airing of the problem), correctability (whether the legal system has a
mechanism for correcting mistakes), and ethicality (when the authorities treat
parties with dignity and respect).324 Importantly, Tyler found that it was
perceived fairness and not case outcome that influenced people's evaluation
of their courtroom experience.325
In addition, increasing perceived fairness may be the best way to achieve
bystander intervention, which many advocates believe is critical for lowering
sexual assault on campuses.326 Bystander intervention (which includes "a full
range of options and levels of action, from speaking to a resident assistant
about an encounter in a residence hall to calling the police")3 27 requires "a
paradigm shift in the thinking of the campus community. 3 28 Tyler and Fagan
found that people were more likely to view police as legitimate when they
believed they were using fair procedures in the way they interacted with the
321. Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First
Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 3 (1998). Reviewing studies on the impact of deterrence, Nagin
states, "I now concur with Cook's more emphatic conclusion that the collective actions of the
criminal justice system exert a very substantial deterrent effect." Id.
322. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 231, 235 (2008).
323. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 103 (1990); see also TOM R. TYLER &
YUEN J. HUo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND
COURTS 7-18 (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,
57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 375 76 (2006).
324. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural
Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 163, 167 69 (1997).
325. Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice on Defendants' Evaluations of Their
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 51, 63 66 (1984).
326. See Joetta L. Carr, Preventing Sexual Violence Through Empowering Campus
Bystanders, in SHIFTING THE PARADIGM: PRIMARY PREVENTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 16, 16 18
(2007), http://www.acha.org/documents/resources/ACHAPSV toolkit.pdf.
327. Id. at 18.
328. SHIFTING THE PARADIGM: PRIMARY PREVENTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra 326, at 3.
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public.32 9 They also found that members of the public who viewed police as
legitimate were more likely to report crime and criminals, and more likely to
work with others in their community to fight crime.33 ° Assuming Tyler and
Fagan's findings hold in the university context-students may be more likely
to intervene when they see someone being assaulted if they feel confident that
the perceived attacker will be treated fairly.
From a procedural justice standpoint, OCR's justification for setting the
standard of proof at preponderance of the evidence is particularly
problematic. OCR argues that the standard of proof should be preponderance
because that is what the government uses in Title VII hearings. If OCR wants
to base its procedural protections on Title VII, however, then it should require
all of the same rights afforded at Title VII hearings. Under Title VII, the
EEOC is barred from releasing the names of those under investigation,33' and
if someone does release a name, they can be fined, jailed, or both."' If the
DCL wants to pattern its proceedings on those under Title VII, then it should
also penalize releasing the names of schools under investigation.
In addition, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 gives both parties in a Title VII
case the right to a jury trial if one party requests compensatory or punitive
damages.333 Having the right to trial under Title VII means that employers
enjoy a panoply of other protections including: the right to counsel; the right
to a jury334 comprised of jurors who have not been excluded on account of
race or gender;335 the right to strike jurors for cause;33 6 the right to three
peremptory challenges;33 the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
(including the complainant); the right to depose witnesses;338 and the right to
the rules of evidence (thus barring hearsay evidence unless it is subject to a
329. Tyler & Fagan, supra note 321, at 267.
330. Id. at 252.
331. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012) ("Charges shall not be made public by the
Commission.").
332. Id.
333. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102 166, 105 Stat. 1071 1100 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
334. FED. R. Civ. P. 48.
335. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 144 46 (1994) (holding that jurors should not be
struck based on gender); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627 28 (1991)
(holding that the prohibition against discriminatory peremptory challenges based on race applies
in civil cases); Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 71 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 87 98 (1986).
336. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012).
337. Id.
338. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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recognized exception).339 Finally, an employer cannot be found responsible
for violating Title VII unless the jurors are unanimous. 340
Not only does the DOE not mandate or even recommend that these rights
provided by Title VII be provided, the DCL affirmatively recommends
against some of them. For instance, OCR strongly discourages schools from
allowing the parties to directly question one another, 34 1 and it tells schools
that they "should not allow the alleged perpetrator to review the
complainant's statement without also allowing the complainant to review the
alleged perpetrator's statement. '342 Cherry picking the provisions of Title VII
that lower a student's procedural rights while ignoring the provisions that
strengthen them undermines the legitimacy of a school's disciplinary
proceedings because accused students will understandably feel like they are
not being treated fairly.
c. Cost
Finally, Eldridge requires courts to consider what the additional
procedural requirements will cost because they "entail the expenditure of
limited resources, [and] ... at some point the benefit to individuals from an
additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such
protection. ' 343 Fortunately, the direct costs of the additional protections
described above are not unduly burdensome. Providing a legal advocate will
not require substantial additional resources, and elevating the standard of
proof, allowing direct questioning, providing full notice of the evidence
against a person, and granting an adjudicatory hearing need not cost any extra
money.
These additional protections are likely to slow down proceedings,
however, which can have a significant indirect cost. Many have criticized
formal rulemaking under the APA, especially the cross-examination of
witnesses, as being "unduly burdensome. '344 As one scholar wrote, "Trial-
type proceedings in rulemaking tend to be drawn out, repetitious, and
unproductive ... In his 2011 testimony before the House Committee of
339. FED. R. EvID. 101, 1101.
340. FED. R. Civ. P. 48(b).
341. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 31.
342. Id.
343. Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 15 (1988) (citing Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1276, 1276 (1975)).
344. Arthur Earl Bonfield, Symposium, The Quest for an Ideal State Administrative
Rulemaking Procedure, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 647 (1991).
345. Id. at 623.
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the Judiciary, Harvard Law Professor Matthew Stephenson described formal
rulemaking as typically resulting in "substantial" costs and delays.3 46
Yet, even those hostile to formal rulemaking still believe robust
procedures are important for adjudicating questions of fact.341 Professor
Stephenson invoked Judge Richard Posner to distinguish between how cross
examination might be vital (and thus worth the cost) for factual
determinations (which is what we have in sexual assault adjudications) as
opposed to general policy questions:
[T]rials are to determine adjudicative facts rather than legislative
facts. The distinction is between facts germane to the specific
dispute, which often are best developed through testimony and
cross-examination, and facts relevant to shaping a general rule,
which . . . more often are facts reported in books and other
documents not prepared specially for litigation or refined in its
fires.348
D. Balancing all the Factors
The last step under Eldridge is balancing the different factors. This Article
has already acknowledged that courts are not going to require the
appointment of counsel in campus disciplinary proceedings,349 although they
may find that students have the right to the assistance of an attorney of their
choice.350 In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court stated that
346. Formal Rulemaking and Judicial Review: Protecting Jobs and the Economy with
Greater Regulatory Transparency and Accountability Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Commercial & Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 9 (2011)
[hereinafter Formal Rulemaking and Judicial Review] (statement of Matthew C. Stephenson,
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
347. See Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO STATE L.J. 237, 254
(2014).
348. Formal Rulemaking and Judicial Review, supra note 346, at 7 8 (internal citations
omitted).
349. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) ("The pre-eminent
generalization that emerges from this Court's precedents on an indigent's right to appointed
counsel is that such a right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his
physical liberty if he loses the litigation."). See generally Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas,
Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 968
72 (2012); Keillor et al., supra note 187, at 469.
350. See Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1978) (affirming that because
of a pending criminal case, the denial to a student of the right to have a lawyer of the student's
own choice consult with and advise him during a school disciplinary hearing without participating
further in such proceeding would deprive the student of due process of law).
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there is a presumption against the right to counsel where there is no threat of
incarceration,35' and although students face serious consequences at
university disciplinary proceedings, jail time is not one of them. Illustrating
just how reluctant the Court is to require counsel in non-criminal cases, it
held in Lassiter that a parent was not entitled to counsel when they were
facing permanent loss of their children even though it agreed that assistance
of counsel would likely increase the accuracy of the proceedings,352 and in
Turner v. Rogers, the Court held that there was no categorical right to counsel
in proceedings that involved possible civil contempt and incarceration for
non-payment of child support.353 Thus, the best that a student can hope for is
that a court will decide that due process calls for the appointment of counsel
in his particular case,354 for instance if he has a cognitive, emotional or
physical disability that prevents him from adequately representing himself.
This Article also concedes that preponderance of the evidence is likely to
be deemed constitutionally sufficient355  even though the stakes are
considerable, and raising the standard would not directly cost universities any
money.356 Some courts have actually upheld the lower standard of
"substantial evidence" in university disciplinary proceedings.35 Others have
found substantial evidence too low and have required preponderance of the
evidence.358 This author is aware of no court that has required the standard be
set at clear and convincing, although at least one has stated that such a higher
351. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
352. Id. at 31.
353. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431,438 (2011).
354. In Lassiter, the Court wrote: "[S]ince the Eldridge factors will not always be so
distributed, and since 'due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in
informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed,' neither can we say that the
Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding. We
therefore adopt the standard found appropriate in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, and leave the decision
whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination
proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate
review." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 32 (citation omitted).
355. See generally Weizel, supra note 46, at 1613.
356. Elevating the standard of proof could slow down the proceedings, which would result
in the opportunity cost of how the participants could otherwise be spending their time.
357. See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding
that the procedures utilized, including the standard of proof, satisfied procedural due process);
Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D. Me. 2005); Edwards v. Bd. of Regents of
Nw. Mo. State Univ., 397 F. Supp. 822, 831 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Gagne v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 692
N.E. 2d 489, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
358. See Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin Sch. Dist., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1119 (E.D. Wis.
2001) ("I observe here only that no lower standard of proof than 'preponderance of the evidence'
could be acceptable.").
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standard may be appropriate. In Smyth v. Lubbers,359 the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Michigan stated in dicta that the standard could
not be lower than preponderance of the evidence in a case in which a student
was charged with conduct that also constituted a crime. 36 In fact the Court
wrote, "given the nature of the charges and the serious consequences of
conviction, the court believes the higher standard of 'clear and convincing
evidence' may be required. 3 61
A better approach might be to base the level of proof on the degree of
punishment. 362 Indeed we need look no further than federal anti-trust law as
an example. The state must prove the same conduct beyond a reasonable
doubt if a person faces prison time but need only meet preponderance of the
evidence if he faces fines.3 63 Requiring a student to receive counseling or to
live in a substance-free dorm is significantly less punitive than expulsion, and
so it seems fair that they could be adjudicated on a lower standard of proof.
With regards to the right to have a copy of the complainant's statement,
however, the Supreme Court has arguably already settled the issue of whether
an accused student has the right to know the evidence against him. Goss
carefully distinguished between the initial notice requirement and what a
school has to provide once a student has denied the charges against him. 3 64
The initial notice requirement is not that high, it requires only that a student
first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation
is.365 As the Second Circuit put it, "[n]otice must be 'reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. "'366
Once the student denies the charges, however, the university has a higher
burden. It must provide "an explanation of the evidence the authorities have"
against him.36' Although a university could argue that it is complying with its
due process obligations by providing the accused with a synopsis of the
accusations through its Title IX coordinator, the accused student has a good
359. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
360. Id. at 799.
361. Id.
362. I am indebted to Ed Rubin for this point as well as for the anti-trust example.
363. See The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
364. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 82 (1975).
365. Id. at 582.
366. Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435, 439 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 941 (1990).
367. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
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argument that the university is only meeting its notice obligation, not its more
weighty obligations under the "explanation of evidence" portion of Goss.
Balancing the Eldridge factors, students should have a right to cross-
examine their accuser as well as other witnesses. Courts have split on whether
students should have the right to cross-examine witnesses in disciplinary
proceedings,3 68 but this author contends that in allegations of sexual assault,
direct questioning is necessary. Unless it appoints counsel or paid advocates
to conduct the questioning, cross-examination doesn't cost the university any
money, and the extra time it takes is a small price to pay for more accurately
determining hat happened. As the court explained in Donohue v. Baker,3 69 "if
a case is essentially one of credibility, the 'cross-examination of witnesses
might [be] essential to a fair hearing. ""370 This author recognizes that the
university has an interest in reducing trauma to the complainant and urges
universities to require lawyers or legal advocates to conduct the questioning
on behalf of the accused. If the accused has not retained an attorney or
advocate on his own, then the university should appoint one. Although
appointing an attorney would be expensive unless the attorney agreed to
handle the case pro bono, providing a legal advocate would not.
At the very least, universities should allow the accused to ask questions
through the hearing panel, and since-as Professor McCormick famously put
it-"a brick is not a wall, 37 'the default should be to allow the question. It
may not be immediately apparent why the accused wants a certain question
368. See Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The right to cross-examine
witnesses generally has not been considered an essential requirement of due process in school
disciplinary proceedings."); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961)
("This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses,
is required."); Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
("The Constitution does not confer on plaintiff the right to cross-examine his accuser in a school
disciplinary proceeding."). But see Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that the accused student had a right to confront his accuser because the rape case turned
on the credibility of two individuals and thus more formal procedures were required in light of
the possibility of expulsion); Dillon v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 468 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D.
Ark. 1978), affd 594 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1979) (where a witness was known, present, and "her
testimony was critical ... due process clearly demanded that the plaintiff should have been given
an opportunity to question her before the school board at its disciplinary hearing concerning the
details of his alleged misconduct"); Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 469 (C.D. Cal. 1977)
("[W]here the student is faced with the severe sanction of expulsion, due process does not permit
admission of ex parte evidence by witnesses not under oath, and not subject to examination by
the accused student.").
369. Donohue, 976 F. Supp. 136.
370. Id. at 147 (citing Winnick, 460 F.2d at 550).
371. CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOKOF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
317 (1972).
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asked, but that doesn't mean it isn't relevant to establishing his innocence.
Furthermore, unlike the practice at most universities, the complainant should
be required to be present and respond.
Finally, students should have the right to an adjudicatory hearing.
Although the author recognizes that the investigatory model is informal and
may demand fewer resources (two values articulated by Goss), it is
inadequate for what is at stake. Although most agree that students facing
expulsion have the right to a hearing of some sort, several courts have held
that when a student is facing expulsion for a disciplinary matter, they have
the right to a more formal hearing in which they have the opportunity to hear
the evidence against them, ask questions and present evidence on their own
behalf.3"2 In Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,373 the Fifth Circuit
explained why such a formal hearing was necessary:
By its nature, a charge of misconduct, as opposed to a failure to
meet the scholastic standards of the college, depends upon a
collection of the facts concerning the charged misconduct, easily
colored by the point of view of the witnesses. In such circumstances,
a hearing which gives the Board or the administrative authorities of
the college an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail
is best suited to protect the rights of all involved.3 7
IV. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE -A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
There is a better way of responding to sexual assault if both parties agree,
and that is restorative justice. As Tom Tyler explains: "Restorative Justice
argues that the social goal that should dominate reactions to transgressions is
to resolve the dispute via reintegrative shaming [which] ... combines strong
disapproval of bad conduct with respect for the person who committed those
bad acts. The goal is restoring victims, offenders and the community. 3 7
Unlike mediation, which treats parties as neutral, the starting point for
restorative justice is that "harm has been done and someone is responsible for
372. See Henson v. Honor Comm. of U. Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Although
Dixon was decided more than twenty years ago, its summary of minimum due process
requirements for disciplinary hearings in an academic setting is still accurate today."); Dixon, 294
F.2d at 158 59; Donohue, 976 F. Supp. at 147.
373. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158 59.
374. Id.
375. See Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule
Breaking: Dealing with Rule Breaking, 62 J. Soc. JUST. 307, 315 (2006).
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repairing it."'3 76 This distinction is important because the 1997 Guidance
Document377 and the 2001 Guidance Document3 8 told schools that they could
not use mediation in cases of sexual assault, even if voluntary.
Restorative justice provides a marked contrast to the way that OCR has
told schools to handle sexual assault. The OCR approach could be
characterized as "progressive exclusion" meaning that as the seriousness of
the offense increases, the offender is further separated from the institution.3 79
This approach may increase community safety and convey community
disapprobation, but it "directly conflicts with the aspirations of rehabilitation
and reintegration, which aim to restore the student's personal well-being and
relationship to their school community.""38 In addition, unlike restorative
justice, traditional disciplinary proceedings are only able to address the
assault on a micro level (between the parties involved) instead of looking
beyond to the forces that helped to create the situation in the first place.
Although restorative justice is geared towards reintegrating the
transgressing student back into the community, it is also dedicated to helping
the victim heal and move forward. "A consensus of published studies is that
sexual assault victims need to tell their own stories about their own
experiences, obtain answers to questions, experience validation as a
legitimate victim, observe offender remorse for harming them, (and) receive
support that counteracts isolations and self-blame."38 ' Restorative justice
responds to these needs. In conferencing (the most widely used model of
restorative justice), the first meeting begins with the responsible person
(otherwise known as the respondent or the accused) describing and taking
responsibility for what he did and the victim describing the impact of the
376. Mary P. Koss et al., Campus Sexual Misconduct: Restorative Justice Approaches to
Enhance Compliance with Title IX Guidance, 15 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 242, 246 (2014).
Koss argues that this distinction is important: Judicial "responses to sexual misconduct must
acknowledge and obviate the negative effects of societal and individual norms that operate to
silence victims and create opportunities for reabuse. When someone has been harmed by another
person, mediation that provides neutrality and treats parties as equal partners in the resolution
process is inappropriate." Id. at 245 46. Koss also argues that because of this difference, colleges
can adopt restorative justice and not be in violation of the DCL. Id. at 246.
377. Sexual Harassment Guidance 1997, supra note 93.
378. REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 93, at 21.
379. David R. Karp & Olivia Frank, Restorative Justice & Student Development in Higher
Education: Expanding "Offender" Horizons Beyond Punishment and Rehabilitation to
Community Engagement and Personal Growth, in OFFENDERS NO MORE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE DIALOGUE 143 (Theo Gavrielides ed., 2016).
380. Id.
381. Koss et al., supra note 376, at 246 47.
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violation.382 Family and friends of both are present for support and are given
the opportunity to explain the impact of the harm.383 A written redress plan is
later formalized that describes "the concrete means through which the
responsible person will be held accountable and remedy the impacts on
victims and the community." '384 This can include counseling (sex offender
treatment, drug and alcohol interventions, and anger management),
community service, and victim restitution.385 A one-year supervision period
is put in place to monitor the responsible person and make sure that he meets
his commitments.386
Restorative justice has been shown to be effective at lowering recidivism
and empowering victims in both academic and non-academic settings. A
2014 study by David Karp and Casey Sacks compared outcomes across three
different college disciplinary processes: model code (a term used for the more
traditional hearing conducted by a single hearing officer or panel), 387
restorative justice, and a combination of the two.388 Karp and Casey used data
from the STARR project, which has a total of 659 complete cases,389 gathered
from eighteen colleges and universities across the United States.3 9° Although
they cautioned that their results may be limited by the fact that they had few
suspension-level cases, their findings showed that restorative justice provided
a positive alternative to more traditional disciplinary proceedings. They
"consistently found that restorative justice practices have a greater impact on
student learning than model code hearings. '"391
Furthermore, restorative justice has been successfully adopted for juvenile
sex offenses and adult sex crimes. RESTORE is one such program that uses
conferencing, a widely-used restorative justice methodology.392 Mary Koss
evaluated RESTORE using a sample of sixty-six cases involving sex crimes.
382. Id. at 248.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. David R. Karp & Casey Sacks, Student Conduct, Restorative Justice, and Student
Development: Findings from the STARR Project: A Student Accountability and Restorative
Research Project, 17 CONTEMP. JUST. REv. 154, 156 (2014). "The model code calls for a hearing
process that is conducted by a single hearing officer or a volunteer board, often composed of
students, faculty, and staff. While proponents of the model code highlight that the hearing is not
a criminal trial, it has many of the similarities to the courtroom process." Id.
388. See id.
389. Id. at 162.
390. Id. at 160.
391. Id. at 169.
392. See Koss et al., supra note 376, at 248.
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Although caution is necessary due to the small sample size, the results are
promising. Koss found that 63% of victims and 90% of responsible persons
chose restorative justice; 80% of responsible persons completed all elements
of their redress plan within one year (twelve months), and post-conference
surveys showed that in excess of 90% of all participants, including the
victims, agreed that they felt supported, listened to, treated fairly and with
respect, "and believed that the conference was a success." '3 93 Importantly,
there were no incidents involving physical threats, and standardized
assessments showed decreases in victim posttraumatic stress disorder
symptoms from intake to post conference.394
But perhaps the most persuasive case for restorative justice can be made
from those who have participated in the process. In 2014, the dental school
at Dalhousie University in Canada was shaken by male students posting
sexist remarks about female students on a private Facebook page. 39 1 The
female students elected to go through a restorative justice process despite
considerable external pressure to do otherwise. At the end, the women
released a written statement:
We made this choice informed of all of the options available to us
and came to our decision independently and without
coercion.... Our perspective and decision to proceed through this
process has often not been honoured or trusted but dismissed or
criticized based on the decisions or perspectives of others.... The
restorative process has provided a very important space for us to
engage safely and respectfully with our colleagues and others to
convey our perspectives and needs. The process allows us to be
involved in a manner that both respects and values our unique
perspectives and the level of commitment and connection we desire.
Additionally, it allows us to address underlying systemic and
institutional issues influencing the climate and culture in which we
live and learn. We want this process to make a significant
contribution to bringing about a change in that culture and hope that
we will be given the respect, time and space needed to do this
work.
396
393. Id. (internal citation omitted).
394. Id.
395. JENNIFER J. LLEWELLYN ET AL., REPORT FROM THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROCESS AT
THE DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF DENTISTRY 2 (2015),
http://www.dal.ca/content/dam/dalhousie/pdf/cultureofrespect/RJ2015-Report.pdf.
396. Id. at 67 68.
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Prominent scholars like Koss397 and Donna Coker398 have called for
universities to include restorative justice in addressing allegations of sexual
assault. Koss has outlined how restorative justice can be used not solely as an
alternative resolution process but also as a complement to a formal
adjudicatory hearing.399 For instance, it could be used to determine the
appropriate sanction after a finding of responsibility has been made and/or as
a reintegration process once the responsible student has finished his sanction.
However restorative justice is used, Coker emphasizes that the responsible
person's statements during restorative justice proceedings must be protected
so that they cannot be used by the state in a future prosecution, otherwise
restorative justice will just become a discovery gathering opportunity for the
state.4 °°
CONCLUSION
The treatment that Erica Kinsman and Francisco Sousa received is
appalling. It is inexcusable that FSU dragged its feet for two years before
finally holding Jameis Winston's disciplinary hearing, and it is unpardonable
that the university sabotaged its own case and that of the state of Florida by
turning over Erica's statement when it did. But taking rape seriously should
not mean stripping students of fundamental fairness. SDSU refused to
provide Francisco with the most basic information necessary for defending
himself.
Safety and fairness are not a zero-sum game; universities can successfully
lower the incidence of rape while at the same time protecting the rights of the
accused. To achieve this, universities need to focus on preventing rape. One
obvious first step is curbing the consumption of alcohol on campus and better
educating students about the risks of alcohol. Researchers have found that in
seventy-two percent of cases in which a male rapes a woman college student,
the woman is intoxicated.40 1 Frequent, heavy episodic drinking increases a
woman's chance of being raped by a factor of eight,402 and researchers have
397. See generally Koss et al., supra note 376.
398. See Donna Coker, Crime Logic, Campus Sexual Assault, and Restorative Justice, 49
TEX. TECH L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
399. See Koss et al., supra note 376, at 250, 252 53.
400. See Coker, supra note 398.
401. Meichun Mohler-Kuo et al., Correlates of Rape While Intoxicated in a National Sample
of College Women, 65 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 37, 42 (2004).
402. Id. at40 41.
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found that sixty-four percent of men who raped women were using drugs or
alcohol before the assault.4 3
Schools should also confront the culture that invites men to treat women
as sexual objects, and they must get control of those groups that condone
sexual violence. Fraternity membership and athletic participation have been
associated with a higher rape-myth acceptance and a higher self-report of
sexual aggression,40 4 but not all such groups are dangerous.4 5 Universities
need to identify the high-risk fraternities and sports and either disband them
or change their behavior. One particularly promising approach is "The Men's
Program," which has been shown to be effective at both changing male
participants' attitudes towards rape and lowering the number of sexually
coercive acts that they commit.40 6
In addition, universities must encourage bystander intervention, so that
students take care of those around them and stop assault before it happens.
Finally, women should be educated about factors that place them at risk (like
alcohol consumption) and trained to defend themselves. A 2015 study from
Canada found that women university students who received certain training
had a significantly lower risk of rape than those who were just given
brochures about sexual assault.40
Unfortunately, even if a university commits to taking all of these actions,
rape and sexual assault will still occur. When an allegation of rape is made,
it must be taken seriously. Investigation should be timely and vigorous, but
unlike what happened with Erica and Francisco, the campus must pursue both
sides of the story.
As this Article has shown, most of the universities studied did not give
students what would be considered fundamental rights in the criminal
context. Since universities are rightfully being pressured to punish rape more
seriously, it is especially important that accused students are treated fairly.
Although accused students do not face prison time, they do face expulsion,
which can create a profound and lasting stigma that undercuts the individual's
chance of successful completion of education and career pursuits. With stakes
403. Leanne R. Brecklin & Sarah E. Ullman, The Roles of Victim and Offender Alcohol Use
in Sexual Assaults: Results from the National Violence Against Women Survey, 63 J. STUD. ON
ALCOHOL 57, 59 (2002).
404. See Sarah K. Mumen & Marla H. Kohlman, Athletic Participation, Fraternity
Membership, and Sexual Aggression Among College Men: A Meta-Analytic Review, 57 SEX
ROLES 145, 145 (2007).
405. Humphrey & Kahn, supra note 319, at 1319 20.
406. John D. Foubert et al., Behavior Differences Seven Months Later: Effects of a Rape
Prevention Program, 44 J. STUDENT AFF. RES. & PRAc. 728, 745 (2008).
407. Charlene Y. Senn et al., Efficacy of a Sexual Assault Resistance Program for University
Women, 372 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2326, 2332 (2015).
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this high, universities need to have a procedure that is fair, which requires a
robust right to counsel, an adjudicatory hearing with direct questioning, the
right to evidence, and a standard of proof set at clear and convincing
evidence. Anything less runs the real risk that innocent men and women will
be found responsible for offenses they did not commit. Moreover,
emphasizing process benefits more than just the accused. Studies have shown
that procedural fairness promotes law abidingness and increases cooperation
with the police and community participation in fighting crime.
But this emphasis on procedural justice should not be construed as an
unequivocal endorsement of traditional adjudication. There are other ways of
responding to sexual assault, and if both parties agree, universities should
offer restorative justice processes. Restorative justice empowers
victim/survivors by giving them control over how their case is handled, which
is what studies show they want and need. Restorative justice also has been
demonstrated to successfully reintegrate offenders back into the community
while also lowering recidivism and keeping victims safe. For universities
seeking an approach to sexual assault that is pro-victim, pro-offender, and
pro-community, restorative justice should be an obvious choice.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
